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[F]our Internet principles that guide our case-by-case enforce-
ment of the communications laws ... can be summarized as:
Network operators cannot prevent users from accessing the law-
ful Internet content, applications, and services of their choice,
nor can they prohibit users from attaching non-harmful devices
to the network .... The fifth principle [I propose] is one of
non-discrimination-stating that broadband providers cannot
discriminate against particular Internet content or applications.
This means they cannot block or degrade lawful traffic over their
networks, or pick winners by favoring some content or applica-
tions over others .... 1
INTRODUCTION
The term "network neutrality" or "net neutrality" has been so ban-
died about of late that even a casual observer of Internet technology and
policy likely has some familiarity with it. Roughly defined, net neutrality
encompasses principles of commercial Internet access that include equal
treatment and delivery of all Internet applications and content.2 For
some, net neutrality stands further for the proposition that Internet access
operators should not be permitted to provide different qualities of service
for application providers, even if those application providers can freely
choose their desired quality of service.3 What the casual observer may be
I. Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, Preserving a Free and Open Internet: A Plat-
form for Innovation, Opportunity, and Prosperity, Prepared Remarks at the Brookings
Institution (Sep. 21, 2009), available at http://openinternet.gov/read-speech.html, [hereinafter
Chairman's Statement]. A sixth principle proposed by Chairman Genachowski is "a transpar-
ency principle-stating that providers of broadband Internet access must be transparent about
their network management practices." See id. The original four principles were officially
adopted in an FCC policy statement for wireline broadband access facilities on August 5,
2005. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities,
20 F.C.C.R. 14,986 (Sep. 23, 2005) [hereinafter The Four Principles].
2. See The Four Principles, supra note 1, and infra Part 1I for a more in-depth discus-
sion of net neutrality.
3. Most often referred to as the "non-discrimination principle," this is the fifth princi-
ple Chairman Genachowski proposed for FCC rulemaking. See Chairman's Statement, supra
note 1. See also Bruce M. Owen, Antecedents to Net Neutrality, 30 REGULATION 14 (2007).
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unaware of, however, is that net neutrality principles are, for the first
time, being proposed for the wireless communications market. Previous
net neutrality regulation has been directed at traditional Internet services
provided by telephone and cable companies. Although the focus of regu-
lation has changed from wired access to include wireless access, the
underlying rationales and assumed benefits from imposing such regula-
tion have not changed. One of the "compelling reasons to be concerned
about the future of openness ... [is the] limited competition among ser-
vice providers."' To be sure, there are well-established economic tenets
that support such a concern.
One of the stated goals of most economic regulation is to support
otherwise vulnerable consumers.6 When consumers benefit from more of
As used in this Article, "application" signifies both applications (such as Google, Yahoo, and
YouTube) and the content delivered by those applications.
4. "[E]ach form of Internet access has unique technical characteristics, they are all are
[sic] different roads to the same place. It is essential that the Internet itself remain open, how-
ever users reach it" Chairman's Statement, supra note 1 (emphasis added). Acknowledging
the unique technology of mobile communications, however, the Chairman added, "The rule-
making process will enable the Commission to analyze fully the implications of the [six
network neutrality] principles for mobile network architectures and practices .... " Id. Net-
work neutrality principles have already made inroads into mobile communications regulation
in the formulation of the January 2008, 700-MHz spectrum auction, which includes "open
platform" building requirements. Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz
Bands: Second Report and Order, FCC No. 07-132 195 (August 10, 2007), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-07-132AI.pdf [hereinafter FCC 700
MHz Band Auction]; American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of Feb. 17, 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-5, 123 Stat. 115 [hereinafter Recovery Act] (allocating $7.2 billion for broadband de-
ployment and incorporating by reference the four original network neutrality principles).
Critics of open access interconnection requirements are battling the current Skype petition,
which seeks to allow consumer premise equipment (CPE) to be attached at the discretion of
end-users. SKYPE COMMUNICATIONS S.A.R.L., PETITION TO CONFIRM A CONSUMER'S RIGHT
TO USE INTERNET COMMUNICATIONS SOFTWARE AND ATTACH DEVICES TO WIRELESS NET-
WORKS (Feb. 20, 2007), available at http://files.ctia.org/pdf/Skype-Wireless-Device-
Petition_2-20-07.pdf [hereinafter SKYPE PETITION]. The House of Representatives is looking
at one version of the zero-price rule as embedded in the Internet Freedom Preservation Act of
2009, H.R. 3458, 111 th Cong. (2009). This bill calls for, among other things, regulation to
"guard against discriminatory favoritism" by network providers and requires the FCC to as-
sess if network providers add charges for quality of service to certain Internet applications and
service providers. Id.
5. See Chairman's Statement, supra note 1; see also Jordan Golson, Competition
Breeds Lower Broadband Prices, GIGAOM, June 17, 2009, http://gigaom.com/2009/06/17/
competition-breeds-lower-broadband-prices/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2009)(citing the Pew Inter-
net & American Life Project in its confirmation of a direct correlation between the number of
competitive choices available and the benefit to consumers); NAT'L TELECOMm. INFO. ADMIN.,
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Networked Nation: Broadband in American 2007 (Jan. 2008), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/2008/NetworkedNationBroadbandinAmerica2007.pdf (noting
the connection between innovation and competition and the policies designed to create an
environment to support both).
6. For example, a stated goal of establishing the National Broadband Plan is "advanc-
ing ... consumer welfare" through the use of broadband infrastructure and services. A
Fall 2009]
4 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
what they desire in a product-lower prices, faster Internet access
speeds, innovative applications and equipment-then consumer welfare
increases. If a market is competitive, each operator will vie with the oth-
ers to become as attractive, and fulfill as many consumer desires, as
possible. Competition breeds the need for continued investment. No in-
dividual competitor can charge inordinately high prices, or fall too far
behind in innovation, speed, or other desirable characteristics, or it will
quickly find itself surpassed by more vigorous rivals.7 In the past, the
premise of the network neutrality regulation argument has been, how-
ever, that telephone and cable Internet service providers (ISPs) are not
competitive but, rather, constitute a de facto duopoly' The argument for
net neutrality regulation of these "last-mile" operators is that the applica-
tion and equipment providers, and their consumers, must be protected
from the inordinate amount of anticompetitive market power such last-. 9
mile providers may exercise.
Although much of the net neutrality regulation debate involves an
examination of the economics of the traditional ISP market (DSL, cable
and fiber-"wired" technologies), the arguments encouraging net neu-
trality regulation have migrated to the mobile telecommunications
market with a noticeable lack of empirical evidence of systemic, anti-
NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN FOR OUR FUTURE, Notice of Inquiry, FCC No. 09-31, GN
Docket No. 09-51 9 (Apr. 8, 2009).
7. It is this competitive phenomenon to which President Obama referred as follows:
If there were four or more competitive providers of broadband service to every
home, then cable and telephone companies would not be able to create a bidding
war for access to the high-speed lanes [on the Internet]. But here's the problem.
More than 99 percent of households get broadband services from either cable or a
telephone company.
Barack Obama, Then-U.S. Senator, Network Neutrality Podcast Transcript (June 8, 2006),
available at http://obama.senate.gov/podcast/060608-network neutral/print.php [hereinafter
Obama].
8. See, e.g., Tim Wu, Why You Should Care About Network Neutrality, SLATE, May 1,
2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2140850S (explaining that the "gatekeepers to the Internet [are]
in most places a duopoly of the local phone and cable companies"); Karl Bode, New FTC
Boss: Tough on Broadband's Duopoly?, DSLREPORTS.COM, May 12, 2009, http://www.
dslreports.com/shownews/New-FTC-Boss-Tough-On-Broadbands-Duopoly- 102398.
9. A "last-mile provider" is a provider that controls the hard-wire media or communi-
cations access into a given residence or commercial building. In other words, given a
communications transport system, it is the "last-mile" in the delivery of content to the con-
sumer. Such hard-wire access is relatively unique and, for various reasons, difficult to
replicate. Many proponents of network neutrality argue that there is a broadband duopoly in
the DSL cable access market. This bottleneck creates market power in the local access market
that is viewed as problematic. See, e.g., Cybertelecom, Federal Internet Law Policy: An Edu-
cational Project, Net Neutrality, http://www.cybertelecom.org/ci/neutral.htm (last visited Jan.
15, 2008). In contrast, mobile telecommunications are based on broadcast technology rather
than hard-wire and therefore bypass the need for physical access to residential or commercial
buildings.
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competitive behavior in the latter.' Regulators and analysts alike have
consistently found the present-day mobile communications market to be
competitive." If indeed this is the case, it calls into question the underly-
ing rationale for network neutrality regulation with respect to mobile
communications.'2
Although lack of competition in the mobile industry may compel
regulatory action, the FCC has demonstrated that a finding of competi-
tion in the market is not dispositive for regulatory forbearance.'3 Because
the ultimate regulatory decision may not rest on competitive indicators,
in this Article I seek to move the debate beyond a pure analysis of mar-
ket competition to ask a more fundamental policy question-will the
proposed network neutrality regulation improve the welfare of wireless
Internet consumers? Arguably, even if the market is relatively competi-
tive, there may be some blockades, or market failures, that prevent the
market delivery of the most consumer beneficial mix of net neutral at-
tributes. Proponents of regulation argue in part that Internet access
providers are unable to internalize the long-term benefits of network
neutrality and thus optimize their profits at socially suboptimal levels of
neutrality." Or, in the alternative, that in an effort to internalize external-
ities, network operators look to discriminate among end users and uses,
10. Most proponents of network neutrality regulation agree that competition is a means
by which neutrality may be provided if consumers so demand. Cf Obama, supra note 7, at 1
(asserting that (at least) four competitors are necessary to combat the theoretical problem of
broadband service providers entering bidding wars for Internet access on standard cable and
DSL networks).
11. See, e.g., Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993: Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to
Commercial Mobile Services ("Annual CMRS Competition Report"), Thirteenth Report, FCC
No. DA 09-54 at 1-2 (Jan. 16, 2009), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-
public/attachmatch/DA-09-54A1 .pdf [hereinafter Thirteenth Report]; Annual CMRS Competi-
tion Report, Twelfth Report, FCC No. 08-28 at U 1-2 (Feb. 8, 2008), available at http://
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-08-28AI.pdf [hereinafter Twelfth Report];
Annual CMRS Competition Report, Eleventh Report, FCC No. 06-142, 21 F.C.C.R. 10947,
10950 1 2-3 (Sept. 29, 2006) available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/
attachmatch/FCC-06-142AI.pdf [hereinafter Eleventh Report]. Anywhere from three to six or
more providers may operate in any given mobile telecommunications market. Of those opera-
tors, four are national facilities-based competitors. See Thirteenth Report, supra, i 2, 14.
12. This Article does not examine the state of competition in the DSL or cable ISP
markets.
13. For example, the FCC has stated that it looks to the marketplace to deliver the bene-
fits of "choice, innovation and affordability" to consumers but will regulate if market forces
"alone may not achieve broader social goals." 700 MHz Band Auction, supra note 4, 200
(explaining the decision to introduce open access requirements to the CMRS market in spite
of finding the market "effectively competitive") (emphasis added).
14. See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 141, 143 (2003); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FuTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (Random House 2001).
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and that such discrimination will reduce application level innovation. 5
Assuming for the sake of argument that there exists some such welfare
diminishing roadblock, to justify intervention the regulatory solution
must be superior to the unregulated results otherwise the "cure will...
be worse than the disease."
6
Whether regulation can maximize consumer welfare above the status
quo is an empirical question. Empirical analysis of new or yet to be en-
acted regulation necessitates the use of a proxy (existing) dataset. The
more analogous the dataset is to the proposed regulation, the more in-
formative the analysis. In this instance I examine two particular
regulatory interpretations of network neutrality currently proposed. The
first interpretation involves a general call to temper the network opera-
tor's ability to meter or impose consumption-based billing practices on
end users or residential consumers (retail price control). 7 Under one
such proposal, broadband service providers would be required to file
their usage-based service plans with the FTC for FTC review of their
"economic reasonableness and necessity" and to assure that no terms are
"unjust, unreasonable, or unreasonably discriminatory."'8
The second proposed regulation I examine is on the opposite side of
the operator's two-sided demand equation and is often called the "zero-
price" access rule (wholesale price control).' 9 Roughly stated, a zero-price
15. This is largely a critique of unregulated network management that looks to solve
congestion problems by, for example, targeting the most broadband-intensive applications or
end users. See, e.g., Wu, supra note 14, at 144 (noting that bandwidth management may result
in overly-broad application layer controls or price discrimination).
16. See generally FTC, BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY 70 (2007)
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/broadband/v070000report.pdf.
17. See, e.g., Angele A. Gilroy, Access to Broadband Networks: The Net Neutrality
Debate, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., June 1, 2009), http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40616-
20090601.pdf("Although most concede that networks have and will always need some man-
agement ... the initiation of metered/consumption-based billing practices ha[s] further fueled
the debate"); see also, Broadband Internet Fairness Act, H.R. 2092, lllth Congress
(2009)(authorizing the FTC in consultation with the FCC to "review volume usage service
plans of major broadband Internet service providers to ensure that such plans are fairly based
on cost.").
18. Broadband Internet Fairness Act, supra note 15, at § 3(b)(3). It is not dispositive to
this discussion that the bill may not succeed. The bill demonstrates a certain type of policy
reaction in the face of metered consumer pricing. Arguably, the FCC could independently
recategorize the provision of Internet access as common carrier (Title 11) service. See Nat'l
Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 1413-14 (2005). Under
Title II of the Telecommunications Act, dominant and nondominant common carriers must file
tariffs, and dominant carriers are subject to price-cap and rate-of-return regulation. 47 U.S.C.
§§ 203(b), 204(a)(3); 47 C.FR. §§ 61.38, 61.41, 61.58; Implementation of Section
402(b)(1)(A) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 2170,
2182, 2188, 2191-92, 2202-03 HNI 19, 31, 40, 67 (1997).
19. See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, Network Neutrality and the False Promise of Zero-
Price Regulation, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 135 (2008). The term "wholesale price control" is ap-
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access rule prohibits the wireless Internet network operator from charging
an application provider a fee to send information to that network opera-
tor's subscribers.2 0 For example, in the parlance of net neutrality, the zero-
price access rule prohibits access charges to applications by customer
networks. The ultimate goal, or objective function, of the zero-price rule
is to ensure access of application providers to consumers and thereby
increase network effects and encourage innovation by application pro-
viders.2 ' This is often referred to as encouraging innovation at "the edge"
of the Internet where some believe all innovation should, and does, re-
side.22 The zero-price rule, given the network principle that consumers
have access to all legal applications, translates to mandated application
access at a price equal to zero.23 Although the goal of network neutrality
is to insure innovation and openness, the regulatory mechanism is price
control-regulated retail and wholesale pricing. There is an extensive
history of price and access regulation in the mobile communications in-
dustry which is examined here to inform the current debate with
concrete, empirical analysis.
In short, I present here a unique empirical analysis of the consumer
welfare benefits of prior regulation in the mobile telecommunications
industry. In particular, I analyze the relative consumer benefits of state
plied loosely here to emphasize that applications that demand access to the network are ulti-
mately "inputs" to the end users' Internet experience.
20. This should not be confused with the price charged to an application provider by its
own local ISP for initial access to the Internet. This zero-price rule is arguably an extreme
version of the non-discrimination principle. Other alternatives may be to permit "tiered pric-
ing" for different categories of like-applications. Because the analysis provided here is based
on analogy, it can be applied against alternative proposals as appropriate.
21. See, e.g., Hemphill, supra note 19, at 150 (noting concern that absent the rule op-
erators may block competing applications or shift costs to application providers, thereby
decreasing application investment and innovation in that market).
22. The transportation network built by Internet service providers is referred to as the
"core." As Lawrence Lessig and Robert W. McChesney have commented, innovation is at the
edge with producers and users, not connecting networks. Op-Ed., No Tolls on the lnternet,
WASH. POST, Jun. 8, 2006, at A23. Contrary to this belief which characterizes the core as just a
"dumb pipe," the edge and the core of the Internet are arguably economic complements en-
gaged in joint innovation. See Hemphill, supra note 19, at 165. The innovations of the core
that have increased transport speeds and provided sufficient capacity, such as streaming video,
have afforded the opportunity for greater innovation at the edge. The dichotomy of core versus
edge innovation does not hold given the joint nature of the innovation path. This convergence
of intelligence at the edge and in the core is problematic to many network neutrality regulation
proponents because it threatens the "end-to-end" principle of the Internet, which would keep
protocol, transport, and application levels separate as protection for the development of appli-
cations and content.
23. See, e.g., Owen, supra note 3, at 14 ("Net neutrality policies could only be imple-
mented through detailed price regulation..."); Hemphill, supra note 19, at 137 (describing
how net neutrality goes beyond common carrier condition as common carriers were permitted
to engage in price discrimination not allowed under the price uniformity of the zero-price
rule).
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rate regulation and federal entry regulation. The institution of filing re-
quirements and FTC review and approval of various consumer pricing
regimes is highly analogous to the consumer price controls imposed by
various state level public utility commissions in the past. 4 Furthermore,
the imposition of a zero-price rule is analogous to past rate regulation; in
particular it is similar to past wholesale regulation with its underlying
principles of open access and interconnection rights to non-network
competitors. Consumer welfare in this empirical analysis is defined in
terms of consumer prices, not in express terms of innovation increases in
the application and equipment markets. 25 A motivating rationale behind
the zero-price rule, and network neutrality regulation in general, is that
each application provider should enjoy nondiscriminatory access to the
Internet for the equal opportunity to compete for the attention of end
users. 6 Consumer prices offer a proxy for the size of the available net-
work because as prices decrease subscribership typically increases 27 As
the size of the network increases, the benefit of network effects (e.g.,
profit, reputation, and notoriety) increases and, therefore, the incentive
for innovation by application and equipment innovators increases.28
My analysis is set forth as follows. Part I presents a brief overview
of a few key elements of the network neutrality debate that have led to
various proposals for direct or indirect price regulation. Part II presents
an introduction to the mobile communications industry and describes the
unique dataset I use. Part III sets forth the empirical model to test for the
efficacy of past regulation, including consumer price regulation and
wholesale "open access" pricing regulation, and presents the results.
24. See infra Part III (describing various state regulatory regimes).
25. Innovation and consumer prices are arguably highly-correlated, as innovation de-
pends on the exploitation of network economies of scale-the larger the network, the more
profit is possible and so, the greater the incentive for investment in further innovation. Price
also has the advantage of being highly quantifiable. In contrast, a quantifiable definition of
innovation at the edge would be highly subjective and quite difficult to track. Moreover, con-
sumer prices correlate to penetration rates, which has the added benefit of acting as a proxy
for (the also unquantifiable) "spill-over" benefits associated with an individual's access to
Internet content. See generally, Brett M. Frishman & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007) (discussing the societal importance of (unquantifiable) spillover
effects).
26. The arguments relating to access and innovation are varied. One argument is that if
applications were charged for access, some applications would never be developed, thus sti-
fling innovation. See J. Gregory Sidak, What Is the Network Neutrality Debate Really About?,
I INT'L J. OF COMMC'N 377, 383 (2007). Another argument is that incumbent providers of
Internet content would pay to block new entrants. Id. Similarly, access providers with applica-
tion businesses (such as Time Warner with streaming video) would vertically integrate and
charge competing applications high access fees. See discussion infra Part fl.B.2.
27. See discussion infra Part IlI.A.
28. See The Four Principles, supra note 1, at 14,988 (Principles 1-3); see also Chair-
man's Statement, supra note I (the Fifth Principle).
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Specifically, price regulation, akin to proposed consumer price regula-
tion and the zero-price rule, is shown to have had little or no benefit to
consumers and may have harmed consumers in some instances. More-
over, even subjectively innocuous regulation is shown to have, at best, an
ambiguous effect on consumer welfare. Comparable analysis of regula-
tion increasing market entry suggests great consumer welfare benefits,
indicating that regulation is best directed at encouraging increased com-
petition rather than dictating specific network neutrality requirements to
individual operators. Finally, the Conclusion sets forth the policy rec-
ommendations indicated by the empirical results.
I. THE NETWORK NEUTRALITY DEBATE AND THE
PROBLEM WITH PRICE
For those unfamiliar with the network neutrality debate, a brief
primer may be of use. In some regards, network neutrality is more a term
of art than a precise goal or singular definition. However, some or all of
the following general tenets are common. Under a network neutral re-
gime, individuals can access anyone or any content available on the
Internet, can use any application they may choose and can innovate de-
vices without the network provider's approval. 9 For their part, network
providers demonstrating network neutral principles do not discriminate
with regard to application (even if the application is a competitive ser-
vice offering, e.g., VoIP), and preferred services are offered on the same
30terms to all comers.
At first glance, these tenets appear straightforward and easily ac-
complished. Behind each of these principles, however, lurks threats to a
network provider's ability to manage congestion, to recoup the consider-
able investment costs of network building, and to engage in the many
contractual arrangements involved in introducing new products and ap-
plications to consumers." In the following discussion, it is important to
29. See The Four Principles, supra note 1, at 14,988 (Principles 1-3); see also Chair-
man's Statement, supra note 1.
30. John Eggerton, Obama Makes Network-Neutrality Pledge, BROAD. & CABLE, Oct.
29, 2007, http://www.broadcastincable.com/index.asplayout=articlePrint (last visited Feb. 5,
2008).
31. Network Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp.,
109th Cong. 59-63 (2006) (testimony of J. Gregory Sidak), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=942054 (noting the importance of the operator's ability to recoup sunk costs and
manage congestion); see generally, P. Faratin et al., Complexity of Internet Interconnections:
Technology, Incentives and Implications for Policy, 35th Annual Telecommunications Policy
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keep in mind that similar to other telecommunications industries, the
mobile Internet access market is characterized by a joint demand struc-
ture, or a two-sided market.3" If the network is the center, the core, on
one side of the core are competitors seeking interconnection rights,
handset manufacturers vying for adoption and applications and content
providers looking for transport. I term this loosely the "wholesale" de-
mand for the network. On the other side of the core is consumer demand
for access to the Internet. This is the "retail" demand for the network.
Listed below are brief descriptions of various aspects of the Internet ac-
cess industry (in particular mobile Internet access) which have been
cited to justify network neutrality regulation. The list includes (A)
restrictions on network interconnectivity and on the use of non-network
equipment, (B) restrictions, blocked access and differential pricing on
certain Internet applications, and (C) consumer tiered pricing regimes.
Sections A and B correspond to certain issues raised on the wholesale
side of demand, and Section C looks at the retail side.
A. Control of Network Property-Network Interconnectivity,
Consumer Premise Equipment and the
Zero-Price Access Rule
Interconnectivity and "open access" requirements are among the
most complex and rapidly changing of the net neutrality tenets. Com-
mercial Internet access in particular is characterized by a host of
bi-lateral contractual obligations and agreements that result in the pres-
entation of content and applications to the "eyeball" of the end user.3"
There are various levels in this transit process at which net neutrality
advocates might call for mandatory interconnectivity rights, seeing such
rights as a means by which application and content neutrality may be
secured.34 Critics in turn warn that given the complexity of the transit
structure, regulators are unlikely to make the nuanced decisions neces-
sary to enhance consumer welfare and are more likely to simply increase
uncertainty in the market and discourage network investment.3 As no
brief discussion will do justice to this subject, no such discussion is at-
tempted here. Instead, presented below is the case of mandated access of
32. Faratin, supra note 31.
33. See generally, P. Faratin et al., The Growing Complexity of Internet Interconnection,
72 COMMC'NS & STRATEGIES 51 (2008) available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1374285.
34. See Wu, supra note 14, at 142 (noting, but rejecting, that structural remedies like
open access might be potentially counterproductive in the promotion of network neutrality.)
35. See Broadband Deployment Plan Should Include Performance Goals and Measures
to Guide Federal Investment, GAO-09-494 at 10 (Gov't Accountability Office May 2009)
(citing the FCC's decision to release incumbent local telephone companies from its mandate
permitting competitors to interconnect to the incumbents' networks with cost-based rates in
order to expand incentives for incumbents to invest).
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consumer premise equipment (e.g., handsets) at a regulated price of zero
(or otherwise).
A prior example of the zero-price rule exists in the FCC decision
Carterfone which concerned the attachment of wireline, consumer prem-
ise equipment. 6 The extension of the Carterfone principle of mandated
access at a price has been proposed, and to some extent adopted, for
consumer premise equipment in the mobile telecommunications mar-
ket.37 The third net neutrality principle is that consumers be able to attach
any non-harmful device to a network, based on the premise that it is wel-
fare enhancing to mandate that network owners allow "open access" to
foreign (non-network) applications, software and equipment.38 Net neu-
trality proponents argue that handsets and various other network
attachments are not part of the network core but are rather part of the
edge-locked into the core only by exclusive phone deals.39 Therefore,
they conclude, that these attachments should be protected from discrimi-
natory network behavior in the same manner applications are protected
by net neutrality regulation.4 0 The proposal is that attachments be al-
lowed on any given network at a price of zero after having met minimal
technical requirements.' Currently, mobile network providers prohibit
36. See, e.g., In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13
F.C.C.2d 420 (1968) (decision) (finding Carterfone consumer premise equipment permissible
and that it must be allowed by regulated monopoly AT&T). See also Hemphill, supra note 19,
at 142.
37. The winning bidders of the 700 MHz C block auction are required to allow "open
access" to their networks of equipment that meets minimal operator requirements. See FCC
700 MHz Band Auction, supra note 4, 202. It is interesting to note that although the FCC
did not find that competition was "ensuring that consumers drive handset and application
choices," it relied on its previous finding that the CMRS market "is effectively competitive."
See id. 200. The structure of the auction itself speaks to the fact that the FCC did not base its
open access requirements on an empirical determination of competition. Out of four scheduled
700 MHz auctions (A-D blocks), only two had open access requirements. If uncompetitive
conditions existed, it is a logical presumption that all the auctions would have required open
access. Moreover, the institution of a reserve price imbedded with the FCC promise to withdraw
the open access requirements in the event that the reserve was not met also speaks to the experi-
mental nature of the rules. Finally, the FCC itself speaks of the open access requirements as a
"window of opportunity" rather than a regulatory necessity. See id. 201. That fact that the FCC
considered the market competitive and yet instituted open access requirements with network
neutrality principles, confirms that the state of competition in the market is not dispositive for
regulatory decision makers and speaks to the importance of the policy question studied here.
38. See Chairman's Statement, supra note 1.
39. See Hiawatha Bray, You're Your Handset Or a Network, Not Both, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 8, 2009, available at http://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2009/07/08/
pick-yourhandset or-a network notcboth/?page=full.
40. Id.
41. See FCC 700 MHz Band Auction, supra note 4, at 206 (mandating that licensees
allow "customers, device manufacturers, third-party application developers, and others to use
or develop the devices of their choosing in C Block networks"); SKYPE PETITION, supra note
4, at 5-6.
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the use of some foreign attachments (e.g., non-network phones and some
commercial lines) that do not meet their proprietary standards and con-
tractual conditions.4 ' These decisions are ostensibly based on various
criteria of network protection, ability to meter consumer use and control
quality, and to provide a unique or competitive device. 3
Network neutrality proponents are concerned that such operator
management practices are counter to product innovation." Many recall
the surge in technological advancement after attachments were allowed
on telephones by the FCC's Carterfone decision. Prominent examples of
telephone attachments that flourished include the fax and answering ma-
chines and, much later, the modem. The proposed objective of a
"wireless Carterfone" decision is not to lower consumer prices per se,
but to increase consumer premise equipment choices.4 '5 However, given
the differences between the telephone industry of the Carterfone era and
the mobile industry of today, a "wireless Carterfone" decision is
unlikely to have analogous results to the original.46
Carterfone was imposed upon the pre-divestiture, monopoly AT&T.
The current mobile telecommunications industry is not a monopoly but a
competitive market." Again, as between the ISP market and the mobile
Internet access market, the state of relative competition affects the eco-
nomic analysis of proposed regulation. In the case of AT&T, a franchise
monopoly, the FCC had imposed rate-of-return regulation. Under such
regulation, the level of vertical integration (e.g., the firm's choice to
manufacture its own attachment equipment or not) affects the costs of
the firm and in turn the regulated prices it may ultimately charge con-
sumers. 49 This regulatory process may distort vertical integration
42. See, e.g., Petition to Confirm a Consumer's Right to Use Internet Communications
Software and Attach Devices to Wireless Networks Opposition of CTIA-The Wireless Asso-
ciation, RM-1 1361 Appendix B at 1-5 (Apr. 30, 2007) (comment of Verizon Wireless); see
also SKYPE PETITION, supra note 4, at 9.
43. Petition to Confirm a Consumer's Right to Use Internet Communications Software
and Attach Devices to Wireless Networks, supra note 42.
44. See Tim Wu, Wireless Carterfone, 1 INT'L J. OF COMMC'N 389, 391 (2007).
45. See Wu, supra note 44, at 397, 420,
46. Not addressed in this section is the definition of the relevant market for handset
equipment. The larger the relevant market the less likely equipment manufacturers may be
adversely affected by the conduct of an individual operator. Arguably the relevant market is
the United States (maybe the world) rather than the individual licensing regions of the mobile
market. See Robert W. Hahn et al., The Economics of "Wireless Net Neutrality" 29-30 (AEI-
Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. RP07-10, 2007) available
at http://ssm.com/abstract=983 111.
47. See Thirteenth Report, supra note 11.
48. Thomas W. Hazlett, Wireless Carterfone: An Economic Analysis 9 (Verizon
Commc'ns, Working Paper, 2007) available at http://files.ctia.org/pdf/Comments-Verizon_
SkypeOppositionHazlett_43007.pdf.
49. Id. at 10.
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decisions as the firm invests in unregulated areas, not to bundle products
in accordance with consumer demand, but to manipulate the permitted
tariff." Arguably, the FCC corrected its previous strategy of prohibiting
attachments and removed this vertical integration distortion in Carter-
fone. In the mobile telecommunications industry of today, individual
providers make extensive decisions as to the most profitable level of ver-
tical integration of their products." Motivated by consumer preferences,
this decision process leads to extensive contractual and some exclusive
licensing agreements of various attachments which may result in a com-
petitive edge.52
It is also the case that exclusive arrangements and conditions on de-
vices may be motivated by such valid competitive concerns as the
protection of the physical network and the ability of a provider to meter
use and charge for provided services. Mobile telecommunications opera-
tors have invested billions of dollars in the licenses and technological
build-out required for a network. 3 To allow any device to be attached
and either damage this network or bypass the company's ability to profit
from its investment may ultimately damage competition and in turn hurt
consumers.'1 On the other hand, if providers act arbitrarily in denying
consumers access to desired features, the opportunity arises for a
competitor to leverage a more open access strategy into greater market
share.55
50. Id.
51. As pointed out by Thomas W. Hazlett, supra note 48, the FCC itself has recognized
this important distinction between the case of AT&T and the mobile industry, and in 1992,
rejected imposing bundling restrictions.
[T]he lack of regulation based on rate-of-return principles, combined with the ab-
sence of monopoly status for cellular carriers, significantly reduces one important
motive for carriers to bundle-to build unregulated CPE costs into the service rate
base and cross-subsidize at the expense of the subscriber. As the DOJ notes, 'absent
a guaranteed return on their cellular service investments, carriers cannot expect to
recover CPE discounts by including it (the amount of the CPE discounts) in their
rate base. We agree with this conclusion.
In re Bundling of Cellular Customer Premises Equipment and Cellular Service, 7 F.C.C.R.
4028 25 (1992).
52. One such recent example is the exclusive offering of the iPhone by AT&T. Such
arrangements may violate network neutrality principles but arguably spur innovation by other
competing firms. See, e.g., Jessica Vascellero & Amol Sharma, Google's Android Has Phone
Debut Via T-Mobile, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2008, at B3.
53. The mobile industry's mid-year figure for annualized incremental capital invest-
ment in 2009 was $19.5 billion. CTIA Quick Facts, Mid-Year Figures, http://www.ctia.org/
media/industry-info/index.cfm/AID/10323 (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
54. Consumers may suffer if operators lose investors because they cannot attract and
retain new customers.
55. This is a basic tenet of a competitive market and is exemplified in the analysis here.
For example, see the aggressive pricing stance of the newest entrant at the time of the study:
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In short, given the distinctions in the level of competition, and the
differences in the technology at issue, economic theory does not predict
that a "wireless Carterfone" decision would enhance consumer welfare
in a manner analogous to the original Carterfone. The analysis in Part IV
of prior wholesale (interconnection) price regulation, less onerous than
that suggested by the zero-price rule regulation, lends empirical support
to this theoretical conclusion.
B. Network Management I-Prioritization by Application
Restrictions and Differential Pricing
1. Congestion Control
As discussed previously, one concern to which a regulated zero-price
rule is a proposed solution is that an Internet consumer not be prohibited
by her network operator from access to all available legal applications.56
Although being able to access "any application" may resonate as a wor-
thy, pro-consumer goal, the reality is that some applications utilize more
of a network's limited resources (e.g., licensed spectrum) than others.
The protocol of the Internet (TCP/IP) is not optimized for time-sensitive
applications such as streaming video and VolP. A network operator may
manage such traffic by using means to control congestion that would
violate the strict application of network neutrality principles.
Network management may take on several forms. To control conges-
tion and maintain quality of service standards, operators have changed
the timing of some application deliveries, charged end users premium
prices for higher speeds and capacity and, in a few instances, discon-
nected high broadband end users by decreasing the revenue stream to
application providers.57
Until 2008, Internet access pricing for end users has been based on
an all-the-broadband-you-can-eat model.58 Few limits have been placed
on the amount of data an individual consumer may download. A problem
has arisen with the rise of several file sharing programs where a few end
users can utilize the majority of a network's capacity affecting the qual-
ity of service to all others who share the network. 59 An early response to
Sprint. Tim Wu also made note of this competitive phenomenon when he wrote, "The fourth
and smallest competititor, T-Mobile, tends to be the least restrictive on consumers and applica-
tion developers." Wu, supra note 44, at 390.
56. See Chairman's Statement and accompanying text, supra note 1.
57. See, e.g., Time Warner's introduction of its high speed "RoadRunner" service.
58. All-you-can-eat pricing models are named for the infamous single-price, open buf-
fet. In this instance the name refers to the fixed monthly price for broadband access regardless
of usage.
59. It has been estimated that 5% of users may use up to 90% of available bandwidth
due to peer-to-peer applications. See Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge
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this scenario has been to disconnect such users or to "slow" (throttle) the
capacity taxing application.6° The practice of slowing the application has
met with public and FCC disapproval, but the problem of congestion
remains. If slowing or otherwise deferring the externality imposed on the
network's users by a particular application is not an option, two immedi-
ate solutions present themselves. The first is to begin charging end users
tiered rates according to their capacity and speed demands. 6' This option
is discussed further below in Section C. The second option is to charge
the particular application (or application class) for using the network.
There is strong resistance among network neutrality proponents to
charging application providers for use of a network. 6' Although this is
not the current network operator practice, it is a logical possibility as a
matter of economics. Network access is defined by a two-sided market
structure. Both end users and application providers demand access to the
network for their mutual benefit. Currently, network operators charge only
end users for access and not application users. 63 It is conceivable that a
network operator may charge higher prices to application operators in ex-
change for more reliable, premium delivery service.64 It is unclear why
such a practice would not be welfare enhancing. For example, if a medical
provider desires that her streaming video of a surgical procedure be
given preferential delivery service (above the "best efforts" standard of
the current Internet TCP/IP), why should she be legislatively prohibited
Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memoran-




62. Then-US Senator Obama characterized the creation of "high-speed" lanes at a pre-
mium cost as providers taking "control over Internet access." Eggerton, supra note 30. See
also SKYPE PETITION, supra note 4.
63. See Gerald R. Faulhaber, Network Neutrality: The Debate Evolves, 1 INT'L J. OF
COMMC'N 680, 686 (2007). Some network neutrality proponents would argue that application
providers are simply end users as they too must pay their local ISP. See, e.g., Reconsidering
our Communications Laws: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 7
(2004) (Statement of Vinton G. Cerf, Vice President, Google). This construct, while true, ig-
nores the two-sided demand structure of networks. For example, farmers may rightfully be
called "food consumers," but such a distinction in the context of the farmers' relationship with
a grocery store chain in which their food is sold fails to capture the core of that economic
relationship. In the Internet access market, application providers pay for their local servers but
also transport their data to, and compete in, the local two-sided market of their consumers'
ISPs.
64. Such preferential service arguably "favor[s] some content or applications over oth-
ers' which goes against the fifth principle proposed by Chairman Genachowski. Chairman's
Statement, supra note 1; see, e.g., Hemphill, supra note 19, at 143-44, n.33 (citing Susan P.
Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications Law, 55 UCLA L. REV. 359, 403-
4 (2007) (noting that particular types of content should not be singled out for high-quality
access, even if the access is provided for free)).
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from procuring it and a network provider likewise prohibited from pro-
viding it? Although arguments have been made that such preferences
will throttle new entrants incapable of paying premiums, there has been
offered no empirical evidence that differentiation of application offerings
will inhibit "innovation at the edge" of the Internet. Indeed, differentia-
tion by speed and quality of service has historically been the means by
which new entrants compete in established product markets.
6
As an example of the type of service which net neutrality regulation
may forbid, a network operator may guarantee an application provider's
speed and quality of delivery service by either prioritizing packet deliv-
ery or by caching data for that provider.6' Large companies such as
Google and Microsoft buy caching services, for example, from private
companies to assure rapid delivery of their products. 6 These services are
welcomed by network operators as it relieves pressure from the capacity
constraints they face in satisfying end user demand.69 Similarly, packet
prioritization may improve the consumer experience by reducing various
delivery problems associated with some applications. By permitting
network operators to compete in prioritizing or caching packets, compe-
tition in these services will increase and may help lower prices and
increase the use of such services by smaller scaled organizations and
new entrants. This scenario is the more likely in a market, such as the
wireless market, that has been determined to be competitive.7'
Regardless of contentions that net neutrality does not concern price
control or rate regulation, as an economic matter, regulators will have
65. In fact, Gregory Sidak proposes just the opposite. See Sidak, supra note 26, at 383
(pointing out that a "market failure" argument is not the right argument to support the proposi-
tion that innovation on the edge of the market will be strangled by a tiering system of payment
for priority delivery).
66. Faulhaber, supra note 63, at 694; see Sidak, supra note 26, at 377-88.
67. In the network neutrality debate, many proponents of net neutrality regulation con-
sider the prioritization of packets to be distinct from the caching of data. The latter is not
considered problematic by some commentators. The empirical analysis presented here does
not consider the manner by which certain packets may be prioritized or advantaged.
68. Faulhaber, supra note 63.
69. Id.
70. Sidak, supra note 26, at 384.
71.
[S]hareholders of tobacco companies benefited when Congress enacted a law com-
manding the tobacco companies to stop buying television ads. The new equilibrium
was that no tobacco company would try to differentiate its product through televi-
sion advertising. The same kind of equilibrium could emerge with respect to
Internet commerce ... [Internet companies] would prefer an equilibrium in which
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simply entrenched the pricing status quo if unfettered network access of
all applications is imposed by regulation. In other words, regulators will
assure that network application access is set at a regulated price equal to
zero. 2 This is the "zero-price" access rule. Although it is difficult to pre-
dict how pricing models may evolve in a two-sided demand system, it is
plausible that as demand patterns continue to shift to higher broadband
use, end user prices will likely increase.3 Network neutrality regulation
will prohibit a business model which spreads or shifts increased end user
costs to application providers. If, in turn, regulated application access
prices are combined with end user pricing controls, there will be in-
creased danger of forgone investment in the network core and
degradation of service] As analyzed in Part IV, interconnection by price
controls and regulatory oversight was utilized extensively by state regu-
latory agencies with no tangible benefit to consumers. This is no small
result indeed, if the transaction costs that accompany industrial regula-
tion and compliance are considered, the net result of regulation may be a
social welfare loss.
2. Anticompetitive Prioritization
There is anecdotal evidence that networks may act anti-competitvely
in relation to competing applications. The two examples most cited are
(1) the cable modem provider, Comcast, slowing (or stopping) video
downloads, and (2) the telephone company operator, Madison River,
blocking VoIP services." In both instances, the blocked, slowed or "cen-
sored" application was in direct competition with the core business of
the operator. To apply the term censorship to these examples is rather
confusing as these incidents more accurately reflect possible abuse of
market power. While regulation may be called for, the distinction is ma-
terial as to which type of regulation is most appropriate. Moreover, while
72. The SKYPE PETITION, supra note 4, recently tabled by former FCC Chairman Mar-
tin, has called for such application access. In addition, the strong action of the FCC against
Comcast's "slowing" of access to BitTorrent, may indicate the FCC's preference for unfettered
application access against network management principles-perhaps even against manage-
ment by differential pricing.
73. This is particularly likely to occur in the short term as higher broadband use begins
to push the limit of a given operator's equipment and spectrum capacity. Over the long term,
prices may level or decrease if compensating improvements in network technology are devel-
oped and if additional spectrum licenses for mobile technologies are released-the latter
development of course being outside the control of the network operator.
74. Cf Sidak, supra note 26, at 387 (relating that a forced equilibrium on the side of the
"service providers" would remove all competition from one sector of internet service, which
would end competitive investment in prioritization).
75. See In re Madison River Commc'n LLC, FCC No. 05-543, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295 (Mar.
3, 2005) (Consent Decree), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch
DA-05-543A2.pdf.
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these two incidents are explained by anti-competitive motivations, they
may also be explained as legitimate attempts to control congestion by
blocking certain high broadband applications. The question is best
framed, not by how to prevent application and content censorship, but
rather how to ensure proper competition.
Madison River has already received its judgment. Even though par-
tially explained by controlling against high broadband use, the threat to
new, rival competition inspired a narrow FCC decision which required
Madison River to ensure VoIP services. 6
The high profile case of Comcast has engendered vigorous cries for
greater regulatory oversight.7 And, while, anticompetitive motives may
be ascribed to Comcast's conduct (e.g., to make a potential rival's prod-
uct less desirable) there nonetheless remain arguments that there are
legitimate network management principles at stake.7 ' As shown by the
empirical findings set forth in Part IV, to the extent that Comcast's activ-
ity has a serious impact on direct rivals, the FCC's case specific
approach in Madison River, as opposed to sweeping legislative man-
dates, would be the least injurious to legitimate competitive practices.
The risk of broad mandates is their possible adverse effect on competi-
tors' ability to control network quality, and thus increase consumer
welfare, by employing basic network management principles. Ironically,
by disallowing network management of this type and by imposing a
zero-price rule whereby application delivery cannot be tiered, consumers
will be forced to internalize the full cost of negative externalities created
by other customers on their chosen network. The likely result is de-
creased quality for all customers which may not be the most fruitful
environment for innovators at either the edge or the core.
However, what may be equally disturbing about Comcast's particular
practice was not simply that it focused on a rival's activity, but that con-
sumers were not informed ex ante that such delay might occur, nor were
they informed when it actually occurred. Presumably, if so informed,
some consumers would have sought alternative access elsewhere that
better fit their Internet use demands.79 Although the company has now
76. See id. At 4297.
77. See, e.g., Matthew Lasar, Reactions to FCC's Comcast Decision Come Fast and
Furious, ARS TECHNICA, Aug. 1, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/O8/reactions-
to-fccs-comcast-spanking-come-fast-and-furious.ars (noting strong reactions in support of the
FCC decision against Comcast).
78. For example, Comcast was attempting to manage its traffic. See Gilroy, supra note
17, at 2.
79. Some network neutrality advocates claim that this is a specious argument because
cable is a monopoly and, therefore, regulation is the consumer's only refuge. See, e.g., Open
Internet Coalition, Common Questions, http://www.openintemetcoalition.org/index.cfm?
objectid--00175D28-FIF6-6035-BF6EA329CD5BD3F4 (last visited Dec. 1, 2009) ("Net
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changed its initial contract to disclose the possibility of such a practice,
it does not inform consumers when the delaying tactic is actively en-
gaged.80 Requiring such disclosure would be a reasonable and
appropriate government response.81
C. Network Management Il-Consumer Tiered Pricing
Regimes and the Broadband Internet Fairness Act
On the consumer side of the operator's two-sided market, there has
been some experimentation with metered or consumption-based pricing.
The advantage of such differential pricing is that it allows the low
broadband user to access the Internet without subsidizing the high
broadband user.82 Under differential pricing, the grandmother who sends
occasional e-mails will pay less for Internet access than the individual
who downloads 1,500 HD movies in one month.83 Price is the most
common means by which scarce resources may be most efficiently allo-
cated. Users must internalize the externality their usage places on the
network. Metered pricing is particularly common in the utilities indus-
tries where electricity, natural gas and water bills most likely contain a
usage pricing element. The mobile industry has already begun to struc-
ture its pricing by capacity "buckets." A flat rate is charged up to a
certain number of megabytes with additional download capacity avail-
able at an incremental rate.85
neutrality keeps the Internet as a free and open marketplace, so that a small number of ...
cable monopolies can't choke off competition and innovation'"). Such logic is circular in that
the only reason cable may be a monopoly is due to the archaic franchising requirements of
local government (i.e., it is regulation in the first instance that has allowed a sole cable opera-
tor to enter its market). Moreover, there are alternatives to cable Internet access (e.g., DSL,
WiFi, WiMAX, and 3G) and, therefore, it is clear that a cable Internet provider is not a singu-
lar or "monopoly" provider of like services.
80. Peter Kaplan, FCC Chief Again Critiques Comcast Net Tactics, REUTERS, Apr. 22,
2008, http://www.reuters.comarticle/internetNews/idUSN2232444820080422?sp=true.
81. See, e.g., Phil Weiser, The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN.L.REv.
273 n.2 (2008) (explaining that the first best solution to assuring net neutrality may be a well-
articulated consumer protection strategy set forth by the F'C and FCC); see also Chairman's
Statement, supra note I (setting forth the Sixth Principle of transparency).
82. For a complete discussion of the advantages of congestion pricing, see Christopher
S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847 (2006).
83. See Amy Schatz, Dionne Searcey & Vishesh Kumar, Officials Step Up Net-
Neutrality Efforts, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2008, at A4.
84. Babette Boliek, Net Neutrality Regulations in the Mobile Telecommunications Mar-
ket: A Cautionary Tale from the Era of Price Regulation, 3rd Annual Conference on Empirical
Legal Studies Papers 11 (2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=l 129517.
85. This is classic "two-tiered" pricing which has been utilized in the telecommunica-
tions industry and the mobile industry in particular for decades. See infra Part IV. Arguably, an
alternative efficient pricing mechanism might be one in which an Internet provider may charge
higher rates for access to, or more specifically, use of websites or webcasts that demand
greater use of broadband (e.g., VolP, streaming video, and file sharing sites). This may be a
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Indeed, the move to two-tiered pricing for broadband consumption
by the mobile industry would appear a natural development. The indus-
try, by extensive trial and evolution, established a multi-tiered pricing
structure, based primarily on usage for its core voice transmission busi-
ness. It is understandable also in this industry that congestion on the
network of tremendous concern due to the industry's technology con-
straints and the spectrum scarcity resulting from the FCC's limited
release of licenses. 86
Several trials of usage based pricing in the wired ISP industry have
met with a deal of controversy. For example, a Time Warner Cable trial
to establish several service tier options rolled out in Beaumont, Texas in
2008 led to an uproar of protest. 7 Opposition centers on concern that
such billing practices will discourage the adoption of applications and
services that, at least in their nascent incarnation, are more bandwidth-
intensive then established programs." Moreover, they note concern that
established video delivery applications are often "bundled" by the net-
work provider and have an unfair advantage against new rivals. 9 On the
other side, operators claim that the growth in bandwidth usage has
simpler means of charging for broadband use than other metering methods but would arguably
be forbidden under a zero-price rule regime. Pricing by "buckets," a capacity limitation, not
only serves to internalize some of a consumer's external costs caused by high broadband de-
mand, it does so in a manner that is content neutral-a strong net neutrality concern. Brett M.
Frishmann & Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the Economics of the Informa-
tion Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 383 (2007).
86. Chairman Genachowski has recognized these concerns in extending network neu-
trality to mobile operators. See Chairman's Statement, supra note 1 ("how the principles apply
may differ depending on the access platform or technology"). The Chairman has stated that
"the biggest threat to the future of mobile in America is the looming spectrum crises." FCC
Warns Of Mobile's Looming Spectrum Crisis Predicted Jump in Wireless Traffic Will Require
More Bandwidth for Devices, MSNBC, Oct. 7, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
33216878/ns/technology-andscience-wireless/. The "shortage of spectrum could hurt con-
sumers and the country" as a "30-fold increase in traffic" is anticipated. Julius Genachowski,
Chairman, Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, America's Mobile Broadband Future, Keynote Address at
the International CTIA Wireless I.T. & Entertainment Conference (Oct. 7, 2009) (asking that
the FTC consider all relevant distinctions in technology, etc., before applying the principles to
the mobile industry).
87. See Free Press Organizes Nationwide Opposition to Time WamerCable Metering,
FREE PREss, Apr. 10, 2009, http://www.freepress.net/node/56030.
88. See Gilroy, supra note 17, at 6-7. There is no explanation given for why new, inef-
ficient technology should be subsidized by consumers either directly (by paying metered
prices) or indirectly (by delayed service resulting from congestion). All other things being
equal, it is unclear why the most efficient user of a scarce resource should not be the preferred
choice.
89. Id. at 6. This later concern echoes rationales for a nondiscrimination principle. The
concern against bundling seems to call for targeted FCC intervention (or at least attention) to
determine if such a practice is harming competition. The imposition of a volume usage price
regulation to all broadband providers-whether they bundle application offerings or not-
seems to me to be an overly broad regulatory tool.
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placed great financial pressure on networks to invest in mantainence and
expansion. A claim disregarded by opponents of such pricing practices
who note that network equipment costs have been decreasing while prof-
its have remained steady.9'
Distaste for metered billing has inspired a bill sponsored by Repre-
sentatives Massa Perriello and Hinkley entitled the Broadband Internet
Fairness Act.92 The bill if passed would cover all broadband Internet pro-
viders who provided broadband Internet service to two million or more
subscribers directly or by affiliate." As there is no carve out for mobile
operators and a broad definition of "broadband Internet" this would
likely cover a great many participants in the mobile industry who offer
even limited Internet access. 94 Moreover, because the industry norm in
mobile, unlike in traditional ISP, is to offer metered/usage based plans,
this would have a major impact on the mobile industry.9
The Broadband Internet Fairness Act is worth examination as it is
similar to the state regulatory regimes studied in Part IV. The Fairness
Act would require that all usage based tariffs would be filed for review
90. Id.
91. Id. at7.
92. Broadband Internet Fairness Act H.R. 2902, 111 th Cong. (2009) (currently referred
to the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce).
93. Id. § 7(a)(3) ("The term 'broadband Internet service' means an Internet protocol-
based transmission service that enables users to send and receive voice, video, data, graphics,
or a combination thereof.").
94. Id. at 9 (defining "Broadband Internet Service Providers"). In accordance with the
definitions, it would be necessary for mobile operators to give disaggregated data on voice-
only versus voice and data and data-only users. It is likely that many mobile carriers would
pass the threshold if subscribership is based on national levels. To put it in perspective, Sprint
Wireless/Nextel with its affiliates counted over 39 million voice and data subscribers nation-
wide. SPRINT NEXTEL CORP., JUNE 2009 QUARTERLY REPORT 23 (2009), available at
http://www.corporate-ir.net/seccapsule/seccapsule.asp?m=f&c=l 27149&fid=6443661 &dc=.
Verizon Wireless alone has 86 million subscribers, and Verizon Communications (most likely
an affiliate of Verizon Wireless) has 2.8 million FiOS (Internet, phone, and TV operating over
fiber optic communications networks) Internet subscribers alone. VERIZON COMMC'NS INC.,
CURRENT REPORT (Form 8-K), available at http://investor.verizon.comlsec/sec frame.aspx?
FilinglD=6558177.
95. See Gilroy, supra note 17, at 6 (noting that this is not yet the industry norm). See
also, e.g., Verizon Wireless, Mobile Broadband Plans for Wireless Internet Access,
http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/mobilebroadband/?page=plans (last visited Dec. 1, 2009)
(showing Verizon flat rate plans differentiated by tier (e.g. 5GB a month or 250MB a month)
and type of connecting device with respective overage rates (e.g. $0.05/MB or $0.10/MB));
Sprint, Shop, http://nextelonline.nextel.com/NASApp/onlinestore/en/Action/DisplayPlans?
filterString=MobileBroadbandCardsFilter&idl2=UHPPlansTabLink_DataPlans (last
visited Dec. 1, 2009) (showing Sprint's two-tiered pricing plan for its 3G network and its
monthly rate for unlimited capacity on its higher capacity 4G (limited) network); see also
Broadband Internet Fairness Act, supra note 17, at 9 (defining "Broadband Internet Service"
as "Internet protocol-based transmission service that enables users to send and receive voice,
video, data, graphics, or a combination thereof.").
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with the FTC.96 Second, the network operator need provide information
regarding the capital costs of the facilities used to provide the tariffed
service based on an attribution of costs of the service. 97 In turn, those
filings will be examined by the FTC, in consultation with the FCC, to
determine if such plans are "just and reasonable" and do not unfairly
"penalize" high volume users." The plan is then subject to a public hear-
ing by a Commissioner (or employee of the Commission) with an
invitation for comments and testimony from the public.99
As set forth in Part IV, this degree of regulatory involvement (filing,
approval and hearing) has been previously utilized by states in the regu-
lation of mobile communications consumer prices."'" The type of costs
information requested and the calculations proposed are well known to
telecommunications economists who have had extensive experience in
such analyses in other regulated industries.' In the end, the empirical
question is whether or not consumers benefit from such price interven-
tion, the conclusions in Part IV question the success of such programs.
In conclusion, critics of network neutrality regulation have often said
that it is a solution in search of a problem.' °7 Proponents argue that we
are upon a slippery slope and propose a precautionary regulatory para-
digm to preserve Internet neutrality.' °3 I contend, however, that a key
threshold question for network neutrality regulation is not rhetorical but
rather empirical. That is, regardless of the degree of competitiveness in
the market, will the proposed net neutrality regulation, particularly as
translated into pricing regulations, lead to an outcome superior to the
status quo. This question is considered in the context of price regulation
and "terms and conditions" regulation. As mentioned previously with
respect to proposed consumer volume usage price regulation and appli-
96. Broadband Internet Fairness Act, supra note 17, § 3(b).
97. Id. § 3(3).
98. Id. §§ 2(2), 4(c)(5).
99. Id. § 4 (d).
100. See, e.g., In re State of Hawaii Pub. Util. Comm'n for Authority to Extend Rate
Regulation of Commercial Mobile Radio Serv. in the State of Hawaii, 10 FC.C.R. 7872
(1995) [hereinafter Hawaii Petition].
101. The call is usually for a form of Ramsey pricing in industries, such as mobile Inter-
net access, which are characterized by marginal costs near zero and large infrastructure costs.
The prices charged must permit the owner to recoup the fixed-cost investment plus marginal
cost. See, e.g., Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, Access Pricing and Competition, 38 EUR.
ECON. REV. 1673 (1994).
102. See, e.g., Amy Shatz, U.S. as Traffic Cop in Web Fight, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2009,
at A2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125329467451823485.html (stating Re-
publicans are likely to argue that the FCC net neutrality plan is "trying to fix problems that
don't exist"). Cf Chairman's Statement, supra note 1 (declaring that net neutrality policies are
"not about protecting the Internet against imaginary dangers").
103. See Chairman's Statement, supra note 1 ("If we wait too long to preserve a free and
open Internet, it will be too late.").
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cation access requirements, and as discussed below in Part II, price
regulation is the tool by which many state regulators assured (and net-
work neutrality regulators propose to assure) consumer price protection
and interconnection compliance. Because state price regulation was pre-
empted by federal statute, it is possible to construct an empirical
comparison of the period with price regulation to the period without and
measure the corresponding consumer effects. '°4 This analysis is per-
formed in Part IV and the conclusions are set forth in Part V. The final
determination is that price regulation did not provide consumer benefits
above the market result and that even low-level, non-price regulation
may have negative consequences for consumers.
II. REGULATION OF THE UNITED STATES' MOBILE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
A. Overview
As previously stated, the possible abuse of market power is a motivat-
ing concern for network neutrality regulation and understandably so. The
history of the wireless industry, however, is replete with examples of
growth, decreasing prices, and increasing competition over time. Indeed,
the wireless industry has grown exponentially since its inception. In 1985,
the United States' mobile telecommunications industry served roughly
340,000 subscribers and generated annual revenue of $480,000,000." By
the end of 2006, the industry served approximately 241.8 million sub-
scribers and generated annual revenues of about $125.4 billion.' °6 To put in
perspective the impact of mobile telecommunications services on the av-
erage household, in 1985 the total number of subscribers was roughly
equivalent to one subscriber per 260 households in the United States.'07 In
2006, the number of subscribers was slightly more than two subscribers in
each and every household.' 8
As described in greater depth below, initially only two cellular mobile
telecommunications licenses were issued per geographic market--creating
104. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312
(codified in relevant part at 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(3)(A) (2000)) ("no State or local government
shall have any authority to regulate the entry of or the rates charged by any commercial mo-
bile service or any private mobile service.") (emphasis added).
105. See Annual CMRS Competition Report, Sixth Report, FCC No. 01-192, app. C,
tbl. 1 (July 17, 2001), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatchlFCC-01 -
192A1 .pdf [hereinafter Sixth Report].
106. See Twelfth Report, supra note 11, at 99, 126.
107. See id.; see also US Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables-Households,
www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/h06ar.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2006).
108. Twelfth Report, supra note 11, at 88.
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a duopoly in each region by government franchise.'09 The first cellular op-
erations commenced in the mid- 1980s."' Then, in 1995, the first licenses
for personal communications services ("PCS") were distributed, thus pro-
viding an additional platform for mobile telecommunications operators to
enter each geographic region."' Since 1995 the number of licensed mobile
telecommunications operators (cellular and PCS) increased from two to as
many as seven (or more) in some service areas."2 In short, mobile tele-
communications in the United States is a sizeable and fast-growing
industry marked by a significant change in industry structure from du-
opoly to oligopoly.
Unsurprisingly, the gradual entry of additional operators has been
accompanied by declines in mobile telecommunications prices. The di-
rection of the change in consumer prices is clear (although the variety of
price packages and bundles offered by different operators makes empiri-
cal comparisons challenging resulting in varying measurements of the
magnitude of the price decline). For instance, the average cost of
monthly mobile telecommunications service was approximately $61 in
1993 and declined to an average cost of $43.73 a month in 2006."' A
casual analysis of the decrease in prices over time would seem to indi-
cate that firms have engaged in some kind of price competition.'
4
109. See Annual CMRS Competition Report, First Report, 10 F.C.C.R. 8844 at 4 n.14
(Aug. 18, 1995) available at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/papersAndStudies/fc95317.pdf
[hereinafter First Report].
110. Id. at2.
111. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Is Federal Preemption Efficient In Cellular Phone Regula-
tion?, 56 FED. COMMC'N L.J. 155, 163-64 (2003).
112. See Annual CMRS Competition Report, Ninth Report, FCC No. 04-216 at 23 n.49
(Sept. 28, 2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-04-
216A 1.pdf [hereinafter Ninth Report].
113. The cost of monthly digital mobile telecommunications service ranged from $80 to
$129.95 in 1998. Annual CMRS Competition Report, Fourth Report, FCC No. 99-136 at 9,
n.33 (June 24, 1999) available at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/papersAndStudies/
fc99136.pdf [hereinafter Fourth Report]. The cost declined to a monthly average of $39.60 in
2000. Sixth Report, supra note 105, at 5; Twelfth Report, supra note 11, at 90 (excluding data
revenues).
114. An assessment that prices are decreasing based on the decline of the average local
monthly bill over time fails to account, however, for determinants that may counter this con-
clusion. For example, in the early years of operation, the average minutes of use ("MOU")
declined so that the price per minute was actually higher than previous years even though the
average local monthly bill was decreasing. If even a simple metric is used to determine the
average price for a minute of use, it becomes clear that the market has not been as competitive
in prices as the average monthly bill declines would imply.
Moreover, the decrease in prices may not reflect the corresponding decrease in marginal
costs. In fact, there is some evidence that this has not been the case. For instance, in a study of
California prices from 1989 to 1993, the California PUC determined that while consumer
prices had declined an average of 14.9%, operating expenses per consumer had dropped by
47%, and capital investment per subscriber had declined 46%. See Petition of the People of
the State of California and the Public Utilities Commission of the State of California to Retain
[Vol. 16:1
Wireless Net Neutrality Regulation
This downward pressure on prices is of great interest to policymak-
ers whose goal is to insulate consumers from suffering the ill effects of
imperfect markets (such as a market with few competitors) yielding
higher than competitive rates. The potential abuse of price is also a point
of central concern to the network neutrality debate. An imperfect market
is one that is marked by operators with market power. Price regulation is
the regulators' response to the fear that such market power might be used
to charge end users higher, non-competitive rates. Network neutrality is
in large part a response to the fear that operators will exercise their mar-
ket power to increase access prices or to block competing Internet
technologies (e.g., VolP), content or non-network innovation.
Contrary to the regulatory goal of reducing prices, however, there
has been empirical evidence that regulation in this industry may itself
contribute to higher prices. "5 This is a result of note for the type of ex-
tensive regulation-from regulating the physical structure of the
network, access charges and proprietary innovation-proposed to ac-
complish network neutrality. The notion that regulatory policies aimed at
the relatively simple, easily verifiable goal of decreasing prices may
themselves be the source of higher consumer rates runs counter to the
very justification for regulatory intervention-to maximize social wel-
fare in the presence of market failure. ' 6 Presented below is a description
of the dataset derived from regulatory decisions made during the devel-
opment of the mobile industry.
B. Dataset
To examine the welfare effects of previous regulatory choices in the
wireless industry, I am able to exploit two unique characteristics of the
industry's regulatory history. First, I am able to separate the effects of
entry regulation from price regulation because of the division of federal
and state regulatory power in the United States. Because of federal licens-
ing requirements, from the inception of the mobile telecommunications
industry the FCC has been the sole arbiter of entry into the market. As a
matter of regulatory choice, however, and as described in greater depth
below, the FCC refrained from regulating interstate prices in wireless.
Regulatory Authority over Intrastate Cellular Service Rates, 10 F.C.C.R. 7486, 7520 (1995)
[hereinafter California Petition]; see also Gautam Naik, Cellular Phone Rates Spark Static
from User, WALL ST. J., May 5, 1994, at B1 (reporting that national price trends for cellular
service do not track declining costs).
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., WILLIAM SHEW, REGULATION, COMPETITION, AND PRICES IN THE U.S.
CELLULAR TELEPHONE INDUSTRY, ENSAE-CREST CONFERENCE ON THE ECONOMICS OF
RADIO-BASED COMMUNICATIONS 41 (June 23-24, 1994) (mimeo.); Jerry Hausman, Mobile
Telephone, in I HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS 602-03 (Martin E. Cave et
al. eds., Elsevier 2002).
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States, on the other hand, due to the distinction between interstate and
intrastate regulation memorialized in the 1934 Communications Act,
were free to exercise full control over intrastate prices."7 The fifty States
(and D.C.) chose a wide-range of regulatory programs providing an in-
teresting array of cross-sectional data. The second unique aspect of the
dataset came by way of legislative intervention with the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (the "1993 OBRA")."8 Under the
1993 OBRA, the state price regulation programs were preempted. The
analysis presented here spans the period before and after federal preemp-
tion capturing this intriguing change in the time series data. Presented
below is an in depth description of the development of both federal entry
and state price regulation.
1. Federal Entry Regulation
As stated above, because of federal licensing requirements, from the
inception of the mobile telecommunications industry the FCC was the
sole arbiter of entry."9 The Commission proposed a novel regulatory
compromise with hopes of preventing monopoly pricing, while simulta-
neously not overloading the market with competitors which could
destroy possible economies of scale.2 Rather than directly regulate op-
erations or prices, the FCC chose to grant two, rather than one, operating
licenses in each market to introduce market forces to prevent providers
from exercising noncompetitive behavior. One license (the "B" license)
would be awarded to the local exchange carrier (the wireline licensee)
and the other license (the "A" license) to an FCC-designated operator not
affiliated with phone companies (the non-wireline licensee).
By July 1992, the FCC-established duopoly market was acknowl-
edged to provide "only limited competition in cellular markets.''
Specifically, consumer welfare (the consumer side of the social welfare
equation) was decreased by the failure of the duopoly market to con-
117. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934).
118. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
119. See First Report, supra note 109, at 1.
120. Id.
121. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONCERNS ABOUT COMPETITION IN THE CELLU-
LAR TELEPHONE SERVICE INDUSTRY 19 (1992) [hereinafter GAO Report]; see also Cellular
Communications Systems, 86 F.C.C.2d 469, 474 (1981), modified, 89 F.C.C.2d 71-74 (1982),
further modified, 90 FC.C.2d 571 (1982) (noting that the duopoly market structure provided
"less than optimal competitive opportunities"); Reply Comments of the US Dep't of Justice,
CC Docket No. 91-34 at 4-5 (June 19, 1991) (stating "there is insufficient evidence to warrant
the conclusion that the cellular service market is in fact workably competitive. In each service
area there is still a duopoly[.]"); Comment of the Staff of the Bureau of Economics of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, CC Docket No. 91-34 at 7 (July 31, 1991) (asserting that "the staff [of
the Bureau of Economics of the FTC] disagrees with the tentative conclusion that cellular
service is produced in a competitively structured market.").
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strain consumer service prices. In 1993, a full ten years after the FCC
issued the first cellular licenses, an auction system for distributing PCS
licenses was authorized under the 1993 OBRA. 2 2 A year later, PCS li-
censes were first auctioned and the cellular industry had several new
rivals. The final blocks of the PCS licenses were sold in Auction 58 in
2005.123 The number of licensed and operational mobile telecommunica-
tions firms changed dramatically after 1993. In the top twenty-six
markets, for example, in 1993 all twenty-six had two operational firms. 4
In 1997, twenty-one of the top twenty-six Metropolitan Statistical Areas
("MSA") had five or more operational firms.
25
2. State Price, Non-Price Regulation
While the FCC held control of entry, the States' authority over intra-
state price regulation, was unabridged until such power was expressly
preempted by Congress in the 1993 OBRA1 26 The 1993 OBRA was
landmark legislation redefining state regulatory power over mobile tele-
communications operators. The 1993 OBRA was passed to amend the
Communications Act of 1934 to promote continued growth in the mobile
telecommunications industry. Significantly, Congress removed the
States' authority to regulate intrastate service prices. (47 U.S.C. §
3320(3). The change in the federal-state regulatory divide caused by the
passage of the 1993 OBRA was so profound that it divides the dataset
into two main time frames: (1) prior to the passage of the 1993 OBRA,
and (2) the period following full enactment and enforcement of the
Act. 127
122. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312
(codified in relevant part at 47 U.S.C. 332 (Supp. V 1993)).
123. See FCC Auctions: Factsheet: Auction 58, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/
default.htm?job=auctionfactsheet&id=58 (last visited June 5, 2007). Auction 58 was a
"reauction" of licenses necessitated by the ultimate return to the FCC of licenses previously
auctioned under a set aside program for "designated entities." For a more complete history of
the designated entity program, see Thomas W. Hazlett & Babette E.L. Boliek, Use of Desig-
nated Entity Preferences in Assigning Wireless Licenses, 51 FED. COMMC'Ns L.J. 639 (1999).
124. PAUL KAGAN ASSOCS., INC., CELLULAR RATES VOLUME ONE-MSAs 47 (1994).
125. PAUL KAGAN Assocs., INC., COMPETITIVE RATES IN CELLULAR TELECOM 13-20
(1998).
126. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
127. It should be noted that even in the absence of federal statutory law such as the 1993
OBRA, the States' authority to regulate would be far from plenary. The federal Constitution
also places limits on the exercise of state regulatory power. Specifically the "dormant" com-
merce clause restrains state economic protectionism and protects the national market for
interstate commerce. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) ("[W]e
have ruled that the [dormant Commerce] Clause prohibits discrimination against interstate
commerce and bars state regulations that unduly burden interstate commerce .. ")(citations
omitted).
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As a result, service providers working across several States often
would face a patchwork of regulations. The analysis in Part IV not only
exploits the regulatory variance between the time periods before and af-
ter the 1993 OBRA, but also the variance in regulatory choices across
States prior to preemption. In so doing, the results not only speak to
whether price regulation is per se superior (inferior) to market outcomes
but whatform of price regulation may be superior (inferior).
By 1992, twelve States had memorialized their decisions not to regu-
late cellular service prices by passing legislation banning such
regulation.18 In another three States, the public utility commissions en-
acted de facto bans on price regulation by formally declaring that they
would not regulate service prices.' 29 In an additional twelve States and
the District of Columbia, the public utility commission generally chose
not to exert jurisdiction over mobile telecommunications operations or
tariffs. 3° Four of those twelve States regulated operators and service
prices in monopoly markets only.3
In States that chose to exert regulatory jurisdiction over the cellular
industry, the chosen form of regulation was either at the wholesale level,
the retail level, or both. A State could control several aspects of commer-
cial activity aside from prices. For instance, the public utility
commissions could require a certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity ("CPCN") whenever the operator started service or expanded its
system. '1 2 Regulators required firms to use standard accounting proce-
dures such as the Uniform System of Accounting.'33
In the mid-1980s, twenty-nine States had not banned regulation, ei-
ther by law or by defacto bans on regulation promulgated by their public
utility commissions.14 Of those twenty-nine, twenty-one required that
Nine States decided to petition the FCC for the right to retain their rate regulation author-
ity. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A-B). Seven of the petitions before the FCC were rejected. In
essence the FCC itself found each petitioning State's mobile industry sufficiently competitive
to negate the justification for price regulation. In order to prevail, the States had to satisfy a
high burden of proof as the Commission had adopted a strong preference for encouraging
market forces over command-and-control regulation. The Commission determined that, al-
though States had an interest in protecting in-state consumers, competition itself was a strong
protector of the interests of telecommunications users and "state regulation ... could inadver-
tently become as [sic] a burden to the development of.. . competition." Id.
128. NAT'L Ass'N OF REGULATORY UTIL. COMM'Rs, REPORT ON THE STATUS OF COM-
PETITION IN INTRASTATE TELECOMMUNICATIONS, 130-31 (1992) [hereinafter NARUC 1992].
129. See Shew, supra note 116, at 21 tbl.4-2.
130. See NARUC 1992, supra note 128, at 130-31 tbl.10; Shew, supra note 116, at 14.
131. NARUC 1992, supra note 128, at 30,91, 95, 105.
132. NARUC 1992, supra note 128, at 130-31 tbl.10.
133. Id.
134. Regulation in Maine and Missouri was banned by statute in 1988 and 1986, respec-
tively. Four States-illinois, Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin-regulate operators in
monopoly markets only.
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wholesale and/or retail tariffs be submitted for commission approval.'35
In addition to tariff filing and approval requirements, five States (besides
Maine) had instituted price cap regulation and three States engaged in
profit regulation.
13 6
Of those States that required commission approval of tariffs, Hawaii,
California, and North Carolina 37 had the most formal procedures. For
example, the Hawaii Public Utilities Commission (the "HPUC") re-
quired tariffs to include exchange area, base rate areas, the "conditions
and circumstances" under which service would be furnished, and a defi-
nition of the classes and grades of service available.'38 Operators
complained that the HPUC's regulatory practice "substantially delayed
new service offerings and alternative rate plans."'3 9
Less stringent price regulation was instituted by Arizona, Connecti-
cut, Nevada, New York, Ohio, and South Carolina. These States allowed
operators to vary their prices within a range specified by either the op-
erators themselves or the public utility commission.'" New York
provided a good example of this "lightly regulated" approach to tariffs.'
4'
Under New York's system, operators established a range of rates for each
element of their service-e.g., access charge, peak minute price, roam-
ing charges, etc.' 42 Once the tariff schedule became effective, operators
were free to make rate changes within the range upon one day's notice to
customers and the New York State Public Service Commission (the
"NYPSC").' 43 The NYPSC would review the rate ranges proposed only
upon complaint.'" A formal evidentiary hearing was required before any
operator was permitted to increase its rates above the maximum set forth
in its tariff.'
45
The remaining States, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Mex-
ico, Virginia, and Wyoming, engaged in a more informal style of price
135. NARUC 1992, supra note 128, at 130-31 tbl.10.
136. See Shew, supra note 116, at tbl.4-2; see also, Hawaii Petition, supra note 100;
California Petition, supra note 114; Petition of New York State Public Service Commission To
Extend Rate Regulation, FCC No. 94-108, 10 F.C.C.R. 8187 (1995) [hereinafter New York
Petition].
137. Arguably formal procedures flow naturally from the type of regulation, profit regu-
lation, selected by these three States. See Shew, supra note 116, at 15 tbl.4-1. North Carolina
deregulated cellular services in 1991. See State ex rel. Utilities Com'n v. North Carolina Cel-
lular Ass'n, Inc., 433 S.E.2d 785 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
138. See Hawaii Petition, supra note 100.
139. See id. at 20.
140. These States engaged in "rate cap" regulation. See Shew, supra note 116, at 16.
141. See New York Petition, supra note 136.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 22.
145. Id.
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regulation. 46 Cellular operators were required to file tariffs with the pub-
lic utility commission ostensibly for approval, but the criteria for
approval were unarticulated and little formal documentation from the
operator was required.
47
Six States did not require commission approval of tariffs or place a
price cap on the possible range of tariffs. 48 Only one of those six States
required the filing of tariffs for "informational purposes" only.'49 The
objective of a filing requirement ostensibly was to provide a monitoring
device so that the commission could assert authority over prices if it was
warranted. The remaining five States instituted some form of "terms and





A. Price Regulation Prior to the Enactment of the 1993 OBRA
Wholesale Reg. Tariff Filing/ Price Cap/
State Only Approval Profit Reg. Other Reg.'
AK, AR2, IL3 , MA, ME', MI', Certification
MO, MS', UTI, WV
AZ, CT, HI, OH, SC • Certification
CA, NC, NY ° Certification
KY, NM, TN, VA, WI3, WY o = Certification
Sources: NARUC 1992, supra note 128, at 30, 91, 95, 105,130-31; NARUC, REPORT ON THE STATUS OF
COMPETITION IN INTRASTATE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 182-83 (1993); Shew, supra note 116, at tbl.4-2.
1. Other regulation not listed includes an accounting requirement that firms in CT, IL, MS, OH and SC use the
Uniform System of Accounting in all financial reports. 2. Price regulation banned by statute in 1991.3.
Regulation in monopoly markets only. 4. Regulation of retail prices only. 5. Regulation banned by statute in
1988.6. Regulation banned by statute in 1992.7. Regulation banned by statute in 1986.8. Tariff approval
required for retail prices only.
B. Non-Price, Terms and Conditions Regulation Prior to the Enactment of the 1993 OBRA




Source: NARUC 1992, supra note 128, at 75, 130-31.
1. Tariff filing for informational purposes only. 2. North Dakota required "registration" of operators.
146. These States generally required board "approval" of the state commission. See
Shew, supra note 116, at 17; NARUC 1992, supra note 128, at 130-31.
147. See Shew, supra note 116, at 16-17. All operators were required to file their whole-
sale prices for approval. Only in Illinois and Massachusetts, were firms also required to file
their retail prices.
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C. No Regulation Prior to the Enactment of the 1993 OBRA
State State Law or PUC Ban
AL, CO, DC, FL, GA, ID, IL', IA, KS, MD, MN, MT, NE, OK, OR,
RI, TX, UT', VT, WA, WI'
AR, ME Since 1991
DE, MO Since 1986
MI, NC Since 1992
SO Since 1988
Source: NARUC 1992, supra note 128, at 30, 95, 105,130-31.1. No regulation exercised in markets with two
or more operators.
Table 2 below summarizes the various types of regulation in place
for those States that continued to have some form of regulation after the
1993 OBRA and final consideration of all state petitions to the FCC.
TABLE 2
STATE REGULATION 1994-2000
STATES WITH CHANGES IN PRICE REGULATION AFTER 1993
OBRA AND FINAL JUDGMENT ON STATE PETITIONS
Federal Entry & Rate Reg. Tariff
State Preemption' Filing Other Reg.!
AK, AR, KY, MA, ME, Wl • Certification'
AZ, CA, CT, HI, NC, OH, VA, WY Since 1995
MS, NM, WV • Certification
NY Since 1995 o Certification
Sources: NARUC, REPORT ON THE STATUS OF COMPETITION IN INTRASTATE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 184-85 tbl.15
(1994); NARUC, TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION 294-99 tbl.21 (1997).
1. Federal entry and rate regulation preemption became effective on August 10, 1994, pursuant to FCC
Decision GN Docket 93-252. According to statute, on August 10, 1994 all States had to either (i) desist from
rate regulation of CRMS or (ii) file a petition with the FCC to seek permission to continue such regulation. For
purposes of this table, those States that show rate regulation continuing until 1995 had petitioned the FCC for
permission to continue rate regulation after August 10, 1994. Those petitions were denied in May of 1995 and
reconsideration of those petitions were generally denied in August 1995.2. States are not preempted from
.quality" regulations or the regulation of general terms and conditions of intrastate mobile telecommunications
operations. 3. No regulation exercised in markets with two or more operators. 4. No certification required in AK,
MA or ME. KY requires USoA.
III. REGULATION, COMPETITION, AND PRICING IN THE UNITED
STATES' MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
A. Hypotheses to Test
The proposed consumer price (retail price) regulation and the zero-
price access rule (wholesale price regulation) of network neutrality are
analyzed in context of state regulatory choices before and after federal
preemption. In addition, the relative value of different types of regulation
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is examined. The specific hypotheses to test are set forth below under
headings (i(b)) and (ii).
Although not the central focus of my analysis, the state of competi-
tion in the industry is highly relevant to ultimate policy decisions.
Arguably, the greater the degree of competition in a market, the greater
is the burden to justify regulatory intervention."5 ' In particular, in a fast-
paced innovative industry such as mobile Internet access, the risk is in-
creased that suboptimal regulation will hinder development. 52 A
thorough examination of competition in this industry is beyond the scope
of this Article, but I expressly consider here how regulation, specifically
federal entry regulation, has led to the decrease in consumer prices
commonly associated with competitive markets. See heading (i(a)) be-
low. Moreover, as set forth under headings (iii) and (iv), I examine how
service and market characteristics may allow a given firm to exert anti-
competitive market power.
i. How does regulation affect consumer prices? Specifically: (a)
To what extent, if at all, does federal entry regulation affect
consumer prices, and (b) to what extent, if at all, does state
regulation affect consumer prices?
ii. How do specific types of regulation affect consumer prices?
Specifically: (a) To what extent, if at all, does "high" versus
"low" levels of regulation affect consumer prices, and (b) to
what extent, if at all, does wholesale price (interconnection)
regulation affect consumer prices?
iii. Does multimarket interaction influence consumer prices? Are
prices higher or lower for operators that compete against each
other in several markets?
151. It is a general welfare theorem in economics that a competitive equilibrium, under
certain assumptions, is Pareto optimal. That is, the equilibrium cannot be changed to another
that would increase the welfare of some consumers without decreasing the welfare of others.
In an ideal competitive market, government intervention would not be necessary to increase
efficiency although some may argue for income distribution policies unrelated to efficient
resource allocation. See, e.g., W. Kip VISCUSI ET AL., EcONOMIcS OF REGULATION AND ANTI-
TRUST 77-79 (4th ed. 2005).
152. See, e.g., FTC, A National Broadband Plan for Our Future, Comments, GN Docket
No. 09-51 2 (Comm. Print 2009) ("Policies that promote competition and consumer protec-
tion can foster new and innovative offerings.... This insight applies forcefully to the
broadband access and Internet content and applications market."); FCC, Fostering Innovation
and Investment in the Wireless Communications Market: A National Broadband Plan for Our
Future, Notice of Inquiry, GN Docket No. 09-157 5 (Comm. Print 2009) ("[W]hile we rec-
ognize the success of certain regulatory policies in promoting innovation, we are aware that
Commission policies and processes can also hinder the progress of innovation and invest-
ment.").
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iv. Does brand recognition affect consumer prices? In particular,
may the mobile telecommunications operator affiliated with
the local landline telephone company charge a premium be-
cause it may be better known than the competing operators?
Alternatively, does incumbency affect consumer behavior?
B. Description of the Variables
5 3
The analysis here examines data for each wireless operator in a par-
ticular MSA at a particular point in time (1985, 1993, 1997, 1998 or
2000). For ease of comparison with prior works in this area, I adopt many
of the variable names and variable choices utilized by Shew (1994).' The
endogenous variable for this study is the log of the consumer prices for a
minimum of 100-160 "any time" minutes offered by a given firm at a par-
ticular time in one of the top twenty-six MSAs. Below is set forth a list of
the key variables. A complete description of all variables and the source of
the corresponding data are set forth in Appendix 1.
Dependent Variable:
Price
Operators offer nonlinear prices with multiple price plans among
which consumers may self-select their preferred plan. The plans may be
broken down into 6 basic components: (1) a one-time activation fee,
(2) a recurring access fee, (3) a roaming fee, (4) a long-distance fee,
(5) a peak per minute fee, and (6) a non-peak per minute fee. '55 To
simplify further, the plans may be described as a multi-tiered pricing
plan where (1) the activation and access fee entitle the subscriber to a
153. See infra Appendix 1 for a summary of variable names, descriptions, and sources.
154. For a more thorough comparison of the variables utilized in this analysis and those
used by Shew, see Shew, supra note 116, at 22-31.
155. An additional price of service is the purchase price of the customer handset. Often
this price has been heavily subsidized by operators, usually in exchange for a long-term ser-
vice agreement with the consumer. Typically, however, authors have chosen not to expressly
include the price of handsets in the calculation of the service price variable. See, e.g., Shew,
supra note 116; L. Keta Ruiz, Pricing Strategies and Regulatory Effects in the U.S. Cellular
Telecommunications Duopolies, in TOWARDS A COMPETITIVE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUS-
TRY: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE 1994 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH
CONFERENCE, 13-46 (Gerald Brock ed. Lawrence Erlbaum Assocs. 1995); Hausman, supra
note 116, at 563-604; Hugh S. Fullerton, Duopoly and Competition: The Case of American
Cellular Telephone, 22 TELECOMMS. POLICY 593-607 (1998); Philip M. Parker & Lars-
Hendrik Roller, Collusive Conduct in Duopolies: Multimarket Contact and Cross-Ownership
in the Mobile Telephone Industry, 28 RAND J. EcON. 304-322 (1997). For purposes of the
analysis here, the cost of handsets is not included in the calculation of service price. However,
future research that redefines the price variable to account for differences in long-term and
short-term contract prices may capture some of the effect of handset subsidies and would be
an interesting point for comparison. See, e.g., Ruiz, supra, at 37 (finding that during the cellu-
lar duopoly the price of service under a contract was 2.96% less than without a contract).
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certain number of minutes of usage, and (2) additional fees may or may
not be assessed on those minutes if they are made outside of the area or
network (roaming), are to a phone number outside of the area
(long-distance), or are made during a peak period.
For this study, the dependent variable is the log of PRICE, log(P),
where P is defined as the monthly bill paid by a single subscriber for a
given level of usage. I examine the least expensive plan to provide the
subscriber with 100 to 160 "any time" minutes of use per month. The
use of "any time" minutes bypasses the need to set a somewhat arbitrary
ratio of peak to off-peak minutes of use. 5 6 The choice of 100 to 160
minutes of use was selected primarily for three reasons. The first reason
is theoretical. The least cost plan is arguably the plan chosen by the
"marginal" consumer. The marginal consumer is the one who is most
likely to have just been lured into the market by an attractive low price
and will also be the first customer to leave if prices are increased. The
marginal consumer is a "representative" consumer for purposes of this
analysis. The second reason this particular number of minutes of use is
of interest is because it is a fair approximation of the average number of
minutes of use for the time period between 1993 and 1999, the du-
opoly/oligopoly period of the study.157
The average "minutes of use" from 1993 to 1999 was 134.158 In the
early years of mobile telecommunications, the average consumer's min-
utes of use actually declined as non-business users entered the market.'59
As consumer prices decreased, the average consumer's minutes of use
began to increase to the levels listed here.'60 Therefore, the average min-
utes of use for the period of this analysis should be skewed slightly
downward to compensate for the missing data from 1985-1992. Finally,
156. When creating a "best price" index that includes peak and off-peak minutes, many
studies adopt a 20%:80% ratio. See, e.g., California Petition, supra note 114, at 7536.
157. See Thomas J. Sugrue, Comments Presented to FCC for the Sixth Annual CMRS
Competition Report tbl.5 ("Average Minutes-of-Use per Month 1993 to 2000") (June 20,
2001), available at http://wireless.fcc.gov/statements/010620cmrsSugrue-slides.ppt (citing
CTIA, Semi-Annual Mobile Telephone Industry Survey 168-69 (June 2001)).
158. Id.
159. See id.; CTIA, Midyear Survey Report (2009), available at http:l/
files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIASurvey-Midyear_2009-Graphics.pdf (for graphs of subscriber data
and minutes of use). The survey shows numbers and usage from 1985 to 2009 (average
monthly bill, number of subscribers, total minutes used, etc.); however, what is not shown is
the average number of minutes used by individual wireless customers. See also, FCC 6th An-
nual Report 22, FCC 01-192, July 2001, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/
FCC-01-192Al.pdf.
160. See Sugrue, supra note 157.
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100 to 160 minute plans are of interest insofar as low-usage plans seem
to have greater price variance than do high-usage plans. 6 '
In addition to the pricing components that make up a service plan,
service plans may be further distinguished as "basic" plans or "discount"
or "promotional" plans. Basic plans are those plans which are usually
available on a long-term basis. Discount or promotional plans are usually
available on a short-term basis, often during a three to six month win-
dow, to a customer who is initiating service or renewing a contract
during that time. Discount plans are a common tool of operators to en-
courage subscription when a new competitor enters the market or in
anticipation of a high activation period such as the holiday season of De-
cember. Discount plans are also a way for many operators to offer lower
prices while circumventing arduous state filing requirements for basic
plan offerings. 62 For this study, the lowest priced plan available for the
given quarter was used whether that plan was a "basic" or "promotional"
plan. The limitation of using discount rates without consideration of
other restrictive terms of the contract may overstate the savings experi-
enced by consumers. However, the choice to use the "best price"
available irrespective of whether the best price is given by a discount
plan is based on evidence that the vast majority of subscribers migrate to
lower priced promotional plans when available. 6 1 Some studies note that
by 1994 less than 20 percent of cellular subscribers were on basic
plans. '64 Subscribers themselves, therefore, exhibit a preference for the
lowest price plan even when such plans may be accompanied by more
restrictive or punitive conditions than other available plans.
An example of a widely used restrictive condition on service plans is
that the plan may require a consumer to lock into a given price for a one
or two year time period. Such contractual obligations force a consumer
to choose between a low price and increased flexibility. Moreover, such
long-term contracts are enforced by high termination fees, typically $150
dollars or more. 65 This may equate to as much as six months or more of
a very low priced service plan making a switch during the contract term
161. Based on comparative standard deviations of three distinct plan categories in the
dataset tested here.
162. See, e.g., California Petition, supra note 114, at 37 (citing L.A. Cellular Supple-
mental Comments, in which advocates for L.A. Cellular argued that "new rate plans [basic
plans] still require significant advance notice and that [California] PUC procedures require
characterization of rate reductions as 'promotional' if they are to be implemented with mini-
mal delay.").
163. See id.
164. California Petition, supra note 114, at 7536.
165. See, Judge: Early termination fee on cell phone contract illegal, caller.com,
July 29, 2008, http://www.caller.com/news/2008/jut/29/judge-early-termination-fee-ceU-phone-
contract-ill.
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highly unattractive. As a preliminary calculation, the lowest price plan
was selected without regard to the term length of the contract. Alterna-
tive calculations of the PRICE variable to differentiate between the
lowest prices for plans of one year or less and plans of one year or more
are reserved for future research.' 66
Regulatory Variables:
State Regulation
The following dummy variables are employed to test the effect of
state regulation. Three regulatory regimes can be identified for the period
of this study: (1) "low regulation" in States where operators faced terms
and conditions regulation, including possible tariff filing requirements,
but were not required to submit tariffs for commission approval,
(2) "high regulation," where operators were required to file proposed
prices for commission approval and/or faced price cap or profit cap regu-
lation, and (3) "no regulation," in States which by legislation or
regulatory decision enforced no price or terms and condition regulation.
Accordingly, three dummy variables are defined corresponding to low
regulation, REGL, high regulation, REGH, and no regulation, REGN.
The excluded variable is REGN. The Broadband Internet Freedom Act
corresponds at least to "low regulation" as it calls for tariff filing. It also
has similarities to "high regulation" as it calls for tariff approval but the





In the absence of collusion, direct competition makes the demand for
an operator's service more elastic, since any increase in its service price
may cause it to lose business to its rival. Increases in the number of op-
erators decrease competitors' ability to coordinate prices and to collude.
Thus, other factors being equal, a market with many operators should
produce lower service prices than duopoly or monopoly markets.
More specifically, each additional operator in the market may have a
greater or smaller impact on consumer prices than the previous entrant.
In accordance with economic theory, it is anticipated that the move from
two or fewer operators to three or more operators would have led to a
decrease in prices. 69 In other words price asymptotically approaches
166. See supra note 155.
167. H.R. 2902 11 1th Cong. §§ 3(b), 4(d) (2009).
168. For this analysis, federal regulation is modeled solely as entry regulation. Accord-
ingly, the effect that the number of operators in a market has on prices is considered a proxy
for the effects of federal entry regulation.
169. This follows naturally from one of the basic tenets of economics: as competition
increases, prices will decrease. See, e.g., FTC, BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION
[Vol. 16:1
Wireless Net Neutrality Regulation
marginal cost as the number of competitors approach infinity. I model
entry with two dummy variables DTWO for markets with one or two
operators and DMORE for markets with three or more operators. The
excluded variable is DMORE.
Service Variable:
Wireline
A market structure variable of interest is the competitive effect of
being the "wireline" (i.e. the local exchange carrier) versus the
"non-wireline" licensee in the market. WIRELINE is a dummy variable
taking the value of 1 if the operator is the local wireline operator and 0
otherwise. Because the FCC decided to license the local wireline opera-
tor and one non-wireline operator in each market, it arguably created an
immediate advantage for the local wireline operator as one who had al-
ready established its name and quality in the minds of the local
consumers. 7 ' Whether incumbents retain market power is of continued
importance in the network neutrality regulation debate as incumbents are
rendered ineligible for participation in certain programs due to the pre-
sumption that they have a competitive advantage in the market.
The interpretation of this variable is complex in that it encompasses
both reputational effects and cost advantages. Some of these incumbency
advantages will be controlled for by the age of market variable described




Many of the firms in this study have extensive mobile telecommuni-
cations holdings. Indeed, several firms' holdings are so extensive that
their licenses constitute a national network. 17' As a result, several firms
confront each other in each of a number of geographic markets. Such
confrontation has the theoretical potential of diminishing the degree of
competition as repeated interaction in various markets increases the
opportunity for reprisal against a firm which competitors view as pricing
too aggressively in a market. In addition, repeated interaction also pre-
sents greater opportunities for the coordination of prices among
competitors. Thus, when firms in a particular market confront each other
in a number of other markets as well, there may be a tendency for prices
POLICY, supra note 16, (stating that increased competition leads to lower consumer prices in
the wireless market).
170. See, e.g., Ruiz, supra note 155, at 31.
171. In particular, SBC, AT&T, and Bell Atlantic had subscribers and extensive license
holdings across the nation. Sprint had extensive licenses but, at the time of this study, had not
yet built out its network.
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in that particular market to be higher. To the extent providers are acting
in concert, this variable may also inform the general "bottleneck" con-
cerns emphasized in the net neutrality debate.
To model interaction, a dummy variable is created for multimarket
contacts with four specific firms: AT&T, Bell Atlantic, SBC, and
Sprint.12 The first three firms have been in the mobile telecommunica-
tions marketplace since 1985. Bell Atlantic and SBC are both original
wireline operators in seven of the top twenty-six MSAs. 7 1 In 1997 and
1998 (midway through the oligopoly period studied here) AT&T, Bell
Atlantic, and SBC were first, second, and third in total number of sub-
scribers in the national market. 7 4 In reverse order (SBC, Bell Atlantic,
and AT&T) these firms were first, second, and third in penetration rates
of the respective total population covered by its licenses (also known as
total, licensed "POPs"). 75 Because of all these factors, it would be un-
surprising to find that the presence of one of these operators might have
a strong impact on the pricing behavior of rivals in a particular market.
An aggressive competitive strategy by one or all might lead to lower
prices in markets in which they compete. If these firms tend to collude
with rivals, prices may actually be higher in markets where these firms
compete. Alternatively, a non-cooperative equilibrium with higher than
competitive prices could arise if it were more costly for a firm with mul-
timarket contacts to cut prices against a rival who might in turn cut
prices in other markets in response.
Sprint is a relative newcomer in the market, licensed as one of the
original PCS operators in 1995 and starting operations in 1996.176 Al-
though in 1997 and 1998 Sprint was too new to have the penetration and
subscriber rates that AT&T, Bell Atlantic, and SBC had, Sprint had pur-
chased a large amount of licenses that made it number one in total
POPs. 17  Sprint is included in the study to look at the impact on prices of
a nationwide "third entrant" in the marketplace.
The multimarket contact dummies are MMATT, MMBA, MMSBC,
and MMSPRINT. Each dummy takes the value of 0 if a particular opera-
tor in a given market at a particular time does not meet the specified
172. During the time period of this study, AT&T and SBC were separate entities. In
2005, SBC merged its Cingular wireless brand with AT&T wireless and, in most markets,
rebranded Cingular as the "new AT&T."





178. In other words Sprint was often the third licensee in any given, previously duopolis-
tic, MSA.
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contact firm in any other market, 1 if they meet in one other market, 2 if
they meet in two other markets, and so forth.
Other Market Variables
Other explanatory market variables include DENSITY, LAND,
AVGINC, TTI and AGEMKT. In order, DENSITY is a measure of popu-
lation in units of 100,000 per one thousand acres of land. The denser an
area, the more efficiently it may be serviced by a given cell site. In addi-
tion, the total area covered by a given operator may affect its ability to
provide service efficiently. Therefore the variable LAND is included
where LAND is the number of acres in units of one thousand in each
covered MSA. The variable AVGINC is the average annual income in
the given MSA. It would be expected that in markets with higher per-
sonal income levels, the demand for mobile telecommunications services
will be higher as well. The travel time index, TTI, is an index of the
commute time for each geographic market study. This variable is in part
a proxy for business density in the market. The variable AGEMKT is
defined as the number of months the market has been serviced. Barring
the exit of the oldest firm from the market, the number of months the
market has been serviced is equivalent to the number of months that the




To control for the fixed-effects that may be associated with each re-
gion within the study, four regional dummies are utilized: Northeast,
REGION1; Midwest, REGION2; South, REGION3; and West,
REGION4. Many of the firms in this study were regional operators (the
regional Bell operating companies or RBOCs, for example). 80 Therefore,
the regional dummy is used to control for the centralized costs associ-
ated with each firm's production function. Moreover, this dummy acts as
a proxy for the local cost price index, it would be expected that operators
in regions with higher consumer price indexes, would charge higher con-
sumer prices. The excluded variable is REGION 1.
Time Period Dummies
The study covers five time periods: monopoly, duopoly, and three
points of time in the oligopoly period. As the industry has aged, and as the
number of competitors in the market has increased, observed consumer
179. The term "indicator" variable is used here as short-hand to designate the use of
binary variables.
180. Firms in distinct regions may have unique operational characteristics that this vari-
able will help isolate. It will not, however, differentiate between operational distinctions
between two operators in the same region.
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prices have decreased. This is exactly what is predicted from economic
theory. In accordance, the five time period dummies should register the
progressive decrease in consumer prices over time. The excluded period is
PERIOD5, the last period in the study.
C. Regression Analysis
A reduced-form price equation is used to explain an operator's con-
sumer prices in a given market at a particular point in time in terms of
state regulation ("R"), a service variable ("S"), market-specific variables
("M"), as well as the regional and time indicators ("I"): Log(P*) = fiR,
S, M, I). The reduced-form price model is estimated using a generalized
least squares method.
D. Estimations and Results
1. The Full Model
The key results of the full random-effects generalized least squares
reduced-form price model are presented in Table 4."'
TABLE 4
















181. For complete regression results, see Appendix 2. A fixed-effects least squares model
was also performed for comparison. A Hausman specification test was performed to test the
assumption in the random-effects model that there is no correlation between the included
explanatory variables and the cross-sectional random effect. The results indicate that the ran-
dom-effects model is both fully-efficient and consistent at a 99% confidence level. In
accordance with that determination, the random-effects model results are presented for discus-
sion and analysis.
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Regulatory Variables:
The results of the model provide no evidence that customers bene-
fited from state price regulation.'82 In those States in which regulation is
considered high (where tariffs are required to be filed with the PUC for
approval), the result of such efforts is shown to increase prices by 4%
over the prices found in States that have no regulation at all. This result,
however, is statistically insignificant. This is similar to the finding of
Ruiz who also found a positive, but statistically insignificant, effect to
her comparable definition of high regulation.'83 It is also similar to the
overall findings of Shew's differentiated regulatory model. In that model
Shew found that the majority of the state price regulatory schemes
tended to raise prices (had a positive effect), but were statistically insig-
nificant.w However, in contrast to Ruiz, in Shew's simple modeling of
regulation, he found that "high" regulation had a negative, but still statis-
tically insignificant, effect. 1
85
Hausman also found the effect of high regulation was to increase
consumer prices and to a much larger degree than that found by other
authors, 15% as opposed to the 4% found here and the 1% found by
Ruiz. 8 6 In fact Hausman directly critiqued Ruiz's finding on regulation
for being inconsistent with his observation that the highest average con-
sumer prices were found in regulated states.'87 In addition, Hausman
apparently surmised that because the decline in prices in 1996 came after
the elimination of state price regulation, then the preemption of state
182. Not addressed here are the costs to consumers in their role as taxpayers, who must
pay for the cost of designing, maintaining, and enforcing regulatory procedures. Adding these
costs to the consumer bill might encourage legislators to ban some or all regulatory activity in
this arena in a preemptive move to avoid such costs. This is especially persuasive in the con-
text considered here, where the regulator is enacting consumer protection policies aimed at
countering anticompetitive pricing rather than trying to protect consumers' health and safety.
183. Ruiz, supra note 155, at 37.
184. Shew, supra note 116, at 35-37.
185. Id. at 36 tbl.5-1 (results for the Price Caps and Profit Reg. coefficients).
186. Ruiz, supra note 155, at 37; see also Hausman, supra note 116, at 593.




1. The dependent variable is the log of consumer prices for 100 to 160 "any-time"
minutes offered by each operator in each time period. 2. The GLS random-effects
regression results are shown. Using Hausman's specification test, the random-effects
model was found to be fully efficient and consistent at a confidence level of 99%. 3. N
= 440.4. (a) * significant at the 99% confidence level, (b) ** significant at the 95%
confidence level, and (c) *** significant at the 90% confidence level.
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price regulation was the cause of declining prices and, therefore, state
price regulation prior to 1996 must have increased prices artificially.'
8
Returning to discussion of the results presented in this study, perhaps
most interesting is that a low level of non-price regulation, for example,
certification processes and accounting requirements, has a positive and
statistically significant effect on consumer prices. In other words, States
that exercise low levels of regulation exhibit higher consumer prices in
mobile communications than those States where regulation is legisla-
tively banned or in which the PUC formally forgoes regulation. For
example, all other things being equal, a consumer in an MSA within a
State with low regulation (REGL) would spend 5.6% more for her ser-
vice than a consumer in an unregulated state, or an additional $1.12 on a
$20 monthly bill. It is exactly these "low level" (i.e., non-price) types of
regulation that are allowed under current law and which States have
shown an interest in expanding.' 89
Looking to the federal entry regulation variable, the change from
two or fewer operators to three or more operators had the effect of lower-
ing consumer prices. The positive result of the DTWO coefficient
implies that mobile telecommunications customers paid higher prices,
approximately 4.7% higher, when only two or fewer operators were in
188. An alternative specification to the full model is tested in which, similar to Haus-
man, the time period and regional indicator variables are dropped. Also the "entry" variable is
simplified to a discrete, "Number of Operators" variable. The most significant distinction
between the full-model and the alternative specification is that the coefficient for the state
regulatory variable for high regulation, REGH, is larger and highly significant. This result is
unconvincing, however, as the variations in the two specifications represent real distinctions.
For instance, the time indicators used in this study may be interpreted as controlling for such
changes in input costs over time. The time indicators are decreasing in magnitude and statisti-
cally significant, showing that consumer prices did indeed decrease overtime. For these and
other reasons, the more conservative results of the more comprehensive full model are pre-
sented for discussion.
189. The results of the random-effects model are distinct from those of the fixed-effects
model. Although in the random-effects model the coefficient of low regulation is positive and
significant, the same coefficient in the fixed-effects model, although positive also, is not sig-
nificant. Moreover, the sign for the high-regulation coefficient in the random-effects model is
positive, but it is negative in the fixed-effects model, although in both models these results are
not significant. The discrepancy between the two models casts some doubt on the dependabil-
ity of the results of both. However, there is some evidence that the random-effects model is
more descriptive than the fixed-effects model.
The nature of the fixed-effects model limits it to the identification of variables that
change over time. That is, the impact of variables which are constant over time-such as re-
gional distinctions-are absorbed into the fixed effect and are not separately estimable. There
is no dispute that many state regulatory regimes changed as a result of the 1993 OBRA. How-
ever, as a statistical matter, it is not immediately evident that the regime changes were
sufficiently numerous to be identified in the fixed-effects model. A structural change test indi-
cated that the change in regulatory regimes was indeed not statistically significant. This
finding supports the conclusion that the random-effects model results are superior to those of
the fixed-effects model.
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the market as opposed to when more than three operators were compet-
ing. The result is statistically significant and is consistent with the results
predicted by economic theory.
Service Variable:
The variable of WIRELINE may have several different meanings
that make it difficult to interpret. It may be a proxy for "brand" and/or
service quality. Due to the nature of the FCC entry program, the wireline
operator is also the incumbent operator who may have additional advan-
tages not fully controlled by the AGE variable. It was expected that all of
these advantages would more likely than not allow the wireline operator
to charge a premium for services. Although the WIRELINE coefficient is
indeed positive, it is not significant and therefore not a major contributor
to the makeup of consumer prices.
Market Variables:
The multimarket dummy variables provide mixed results. Only one
of the three dummies, MMBA is not significant. Two of the four,
MMATT and MMSPRINT are highly significant with positive coeffi-
cients. This translates to higher prices for consumers when rival firms
meet these two providers in multiple markets. A possible interpretation
of this result relates to a key similarity between the two operators-
Sprint and AT&T are numbers one and two in the total number of li-
censed POPs. For both Sprint and AT&T, this large number of POPs is
due to the great number of licenses they hold and the wide coverage they
enjoy. In turn, this greater coverage area translates into more multimar-
ket contacts with competing firms. The results tend to suggest that the
higher the absolute number of multimarket contacts the firm has, the
190
greater is its ability to influence increases in consumer prices.
An intriguing result is that multimarket contact with SBC has a
negative impact on the prices of its competitors. For each additional
market in which rivals also compete against SBC, prices are lower. A
possible explanation may be associated with the fact that SBC is the
competitor that had the highest penetration rates in its licensed POPs of
the three other firms modeled. Its deep penetration rates suggest that
SBC's competitive strategy may be explained by a theory set forth by
Bemheim and Whinston (1990).' 9' Bernheim and Whinston point out that
a firm facing interaction with competitors across many markets may de-
cide to fight vigorously and simultaneously in all markets so that its
short-term gains are not just in one market, but in all its markets. 92
190. PAUL KAGAN ASSOCS., INC., supra note 173.
191. Douglas Bemheim & Michael Whinston, Multimarket Contact and Collusive Be-
havior, 21 RAND J. ECON. 1 (1990).
192. Id. at 2.
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Of the remaining market variables (DENSITY, LAND, AVGINC,
TTI and AGEMKT) only LAND and DENSITY are statistically signifi-
cant. The LAND variable coefficient is positive and highly significant. If
the LAND area of the MSA is greater than in other studied MSAs, the
prices charged by firms are also slightly higher. This corresponds with
the interpretation that, controlling for population density, the size of the
area contributes to the costs of operation and consequently leads to
higher consumer prices. The coefficient of the variable of population
density, DENSITY, is also significant and is negative. The negative sign
of this coefficient supports the interpretation that higher levels of density
in an area provide an operator the opportunity to efficiently provide ser-
vice to more subscribers at a given price than is possible in more
sparsely populated areas. If population is not dense, operators must cre-
ate more cells to cover the area which necessitates a greater degree of
capital investment than in highly populated areas.
Indicator Variables:
As expected, the time period indicators may be interpreted to show
decreasing consumer prices over time. The excluded indicator is that of
the last oligopoly period studied, the year 2000. Each prior time period
has a positive and significant coefficient indicating that each time period
prior to the last had higher consumer prices. Moreover, the coefficients
of each succeeding time period are decreasing such that the coefficient
for PERIOD1 > PERIOD2 > PERIOD3 > PERIOD4. Again, this is the
expected result that demonstrates that consumer prices were decreasing
over time.
The only significant regional indicator was that of REGION2, the
Midwest. The excluded regional indicator was the Northeast and, there-
fore, the negative coefficient on REGION2 indicates that consumer
prices in the Midwest were lower than those in the Northeast. Given the
comparative consumer price indices of these two regions, this is as
would be expected.
2. The Full Model with Differentiation of State Regulatory Programs
To test the effects of a specific type of regulation, the regulatory
variables of the full reduced-form price model are redefined in two varia-
tions. First, the regulatory variable REGH is more specifically defined to
distinguish between two types of "high" regulation: (1) tariff approval
requirements combined with price cap or profit regulation, REGPCPR,
9 3
193. Price cap and profit regulation regimes are separate and distinct forms of industrial
regulation and, ideally, should be tested as separate explanatory variables. In this study, how-
ever, four States practiced price cap regulation and only two States practiced profit regulation.
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and (2) tariff approval requirements alone, REGOH. The results are set
forth below in Table 5.
The second formulation of regulation redefines the regulatory vari-
able to pinpoint those states which engaged in wholesale price controls.
This construction is particularly informative to the network neutrality
debate as this choice of regulation is most akin to that proposed under
the network neutrality rubric encapsulated by the zero price rule. To iso-
late the effect of wholesale price regulation REGH is disaggregated to
two variables, "high" regulation of wholesale and consumer prices,
REGHWC, and "high" regulation of wholesale prices only. REGL is
similarly disaggregated to the two variables REGLWC and REGLW. The
results are set forth below in Table 6.
TABLE 5
EFFECTS OF PRICE CAP AND PROFIT REGULATION
(i) (ii)
Full Reduced-Form Model with
Variable Full Reduced-Form Model Regulatory Differentiation
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
Regulatory Variables Equation (i)
REGL I 0.0563* 0.0255
REGH 0.0382 0.0436




1. Coefficient for REGPCPR significant at the 87% level. 2.The dependent variable for both models is the log of
consumer prices for 100 to 160 "any-time" minutes offered by each operator in each time period. 3. N = 440.4.
(a) * significant at the 99% confidence level, (b) ** significant at the 95% confidence level, and (c) *** significant
at the 90% confidence level.
In Table 5, Column (ii), regulation is modeled with three different
variables.' 94 Similar to the full-model results presented in Column (i),
the coefficient for low regulation is positive and statistically signifi-
cant. The coefficient of the second regulatory variable, REGOH, is
negative, indicating that tariff approval requirements lead to lower con-
sumer prices; however, it is not statistically significant. Therefore, it is
To overcome the small sample size of these two regimes, I combined them as, arguably, each
raises corporate responsibility to a similar and greater degree than other regulatory regimes
(such as regulatory approval of tariff filings). A subsequent analysis with the price cap and
profit regulation regimes estimated separately resulted in similar coefficients to the combined
estimation. As expected, the separately estimated coefficients were less significant than the
jointly estimated variable.
194. For complete regression results, see Appendix 3.
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not possible to conclude that requiring tariff approval lowers consumer
prices.
The third regulatory variable is REGPCPR. Arguably the price cap
and profit regulation mechanisms, although separate and distinct pro-
grams, are the most onerous forms of price regulation practiced. To
comply with these regimes, firms often must submit information on
their costs, subscriber numbers, and profit margins. Such information is
closely guarded by most firms, as it reveals a great deal of strategic
information to rivals. Interestingly, the coefficient of this variable is
positive indicating that this costly (to both firm and regulator) and in-
trusive regulatory scheme might actually raise prices rather than lower
them. Such a result frustrates the goal of consumer protection and ad-
vocacy which is a primary justification for the regulation of private
enterprises. However, the coefficient on REGPCPR is slightly below
the 90% confidence level. This low level of significance may be due to
the small sample size of States in this study that practiced price cap
and profit regulation--only five States and only in the monopoly and
duopoly periods. Nonetheless, the result is intriguing and would be an
interesting factor to test in future research.
TABLE 6
EFFECTS OF WHOLESALE PRICE REGULATION
(i) (ii)
Full Reduced-Form Model with
Regulatory Differentiation of
Variable Full Reduced-Form Model Wholesale Prices
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
Regulatory Variables Equation (i)
REGL 0.0563** 0.0255
REGH 0.0382 0.0436





1. Coefficient for REGPCPR significant at the 87% level. 2. The dependent variable for both models is the log of
consumer prices for 100 to 160 "any-time" minutes offered by each operator in each time period. 3. N = 440.4.
(a) * significant at the 99% confidence level, (b) ** significant at the 95% confidence level, and (c) *** significant
at the 90% confidence level. 5. The "Mutual Variables' of Table 14(ii) are of similar sign and magnitude to those
set forth in Table 13(i) and are omitted for reasons of brevity.
In Table 6, Column (ii), regulation is modeled with four different
variables. The four variables introduce, and specifically test, the effect of
regulation in the wholesale market. States made one of five choices in
[Vol. 16:1
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this arena, (1) applied "low regulation" to both the retail and wholesale
markets for mobile services (REGLWC); (2) applied "low regulation" to
the wholesale market only (REGLW); (3) applied "high regulation" to
the wholesale and retail markets (REGHWC); (4) applied "high regula-
tion" to the wholesale market only (REGHW) or (5) applied no
regulation at all. Similar to the full-model results presented in Column
(i), the resulting three estimates for the various coefficient formulations
are positive. In particular, the coefficient for low regulation of both con-
sumer and welfare prices is positive and statistically significant. This
indicates that even relatively low, or presumably innocuous, regulation
of wholesale and consumer prices may lead to higher consumer prices.
Interestingly the other two results for REGHWC and REGHW are
positive, indicating once again that intrusive regulatory schemes might
actually raise prices rather than lower them. However, the coefficients on
these variables are not statistically significant and, therefore, definitive
conclusions as to their impact on consumer prices cannot be made.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The empirical results presented here have some interesting implica-
tions for the debate on network neutrality regulation of wireless Internet
access providers. The presumed objective of industrial regulation is that
consumer welfare will increase in the regulated market to a level over
and above that attained in the unregulated market. The risk of suboptimal
regulation, however, is that not only may it fail to increase consumer
welfare, but it may actually lead to a net loss in consumer welfare.
Suboptimal regulation can, therefore, be less preferable than the total
absence of regulation even in imperfect or noncompetitive markets.
In this analysis, there is no evidence that regulation lowered con-
sumer prices. If consumer prices are not lowered, penetration rates may
not increase and the incentive to innovate created by increased network
size is less likely realized. Moreover, there is no evidence to show that
the result of price regulation such as that proposed for volume usage
plans would have greater consumer benefit than the consumer rate regu-
lation regimes studied here. Nor is there evidence that the zero-price
rule, mandated access with a price control set to zero, would have greater
consumer benefit than did previous interconnection mandates and
wholesale price regulation. To the contrary, as demonstrated some state
regulation-even relatively innocuous forms of regulation, such as certi-
fication processes and accounting requirements-actually lead to
increased consumer prices. Such results again belie any presumption that
regulation is consumer welfare enhancing per se. These results should
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also counsel regulators to use caution in evaluating the benefits of even
subjectively minor regulation as it appears to add real costs to consum-
ers. The past regulatory experience in the industry provides a cautionary
warning that such intrusion may be counter to the desired outcome of
enhancing consumer welfare.
On the other hand, there is evidence that increased market entry
lowered consumer prices. A corollary to this conclusion is that the FCC's
past delay in licensing a fifth, sixth, and seventh operator may have led
to the maintenance of higher prices and, thus, to consumer welfare
losses. Such losses directly caused by regulatory policy, coupled with the
success of direct competition, suggest that the FCC should liberalize its
licensing of spectrum rather than hamper its rapid and efficient alloca-
tion with "open access" and other network neutrality requirements. In
other words, the most consumer welfare enhancing regulation is syn-
onymous with regulation that enhances competition. Network neutrality
demands arguably tie the hands of operators to control their own net-
works, to provide acceptable quality of service levels and to differentiate
their service by price, innovation, exclusive content, equipment partner-
ships or flexible usage rules.
Competition in wireless Internet access has the added benefit of
perhaps reducing the concerns of network neutrality proponents in the
parallel market of DSL and cable Internet provision. The entry of four
facilities-based providers and several mobile resellers into the "last-
mile" provision of at-home Internet services will place increasing
competitive pressure for the market to move towards a zero-price rule if
that is indeed the socially optimal outcome. Therefore, increasing com-
petition, rather than stifling price experimentation in the consumer
market and mandating application access prices in the application mar-
ket, appears to be the more welfare-enhancing regulatory objective.
[Vol. 16:1
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APPENDIX 1
TABLE OF DATA DESCRITPIONS AND SOURCE
Variable Name Description Source of Data
Length of time market has been Various publications of Paul Kaganserviced in months. Associates and FCC licensing
records.
AVGINC Average annual income. State of the Cities Data Systems
AVGINCAverageannalincome. ("SOCDS") census data.
A measure of population in units of
DENSITY 100,000 per one thousand acres of SOCDS census data.
land.
Dummy variables to control for the Various publications by Paul Kagan
DTWO, DMORE presence of two or fewer or more Associates and quarterly reports by
than two operators in the market. Econ One.
LAND Area in 1,000s of acres. United States Census Department.
If given operator in a given MSA has
contact with ATT (or BA, SBC, or Various publications by Paul Kagan
MMATT MMBA; MMSBC; SPRINT) in no other markets Associates and quarterly price data
MMSPRINT MMATT = 0; 1 if one other market es y pried
contact with AU', 2 if two other reports by Econ One.
market contacts, etc.
PERIODI, 2,3,4,5 Indicator variables of the respective Determined by PRICE data
years of the dataset. sources.
POP The average population in 100,000s SOCDS census data.as of the end of year.
Various publications by Paul Kagan
PRICE Average, least cost plan for 100- Associates, quarterly price data
160 "any time" minutes per month. reports by Econ One and FCC
report.
Indicator variables of Northeastern,
REGION1, 2, 3, 4 Midwestern, Southern and Western U.S. Census Bureau.
regions of the United States.
Reports on the status of competition
If operator is required to meet non- in intrastate telecommunications by
REGL price regulation standards only the National Association of
REGL = 1; 0 otherwise. Regulatory Utility Commissioners
("NARUC").
If operator is required to file tariffs Reports on the status of competition
REGH for commission approval REGH = 1; in intrastate telecommunications by
0 otherwise. NARUC.
If operator is required to file tariffs Reports on the status of competition
REGOH for commission approval only in intrastate telecommunications by
REGOH=1; 0 otherwise. NARUC.
If operator is required to file tariffs
for commission approval and is Reports on the status of competition
REGPCPR subject also to price cap or profit in intrastate telecommunications by
regulation REGPCPR=1; NARUC.
0 otherwise.
If operator is subject to "low" or Reports on the status of competition
REGLWC, REGHWC "high" wholesale and consumer in intrastate telecommunications by
price regulation REGLWC, NARUC.
REGHWC = 1, 0 otherwise.
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Variable Name Description Source of Data
It operator is subject to low" or Reports on the status of competition
REGLW REGHW "high" wholesale price regulation in intrastate telecommunications by
only REGLW, REGHW = 1,0 NARUC.
otherwise.
The Travel Time Index (TTI) where 2004 Urban Mobility Study
TTI TTI is an index of the commute published by the Texas
time. Transportation Institute.
A dummy variable equal to 1 to
WIRELINE indicate the local exchange operator Various publications by Paul Kagan
granted an FCC "wireline" license Associates.
and 0 otherwise.
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APPENDIX 2
ESTIMATES OF THE REDUCED-FORM PRICE MODEL FOR
MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
(I) (ii)
Variable Random-Effects Model Fixed-Effects Model
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
Regulatory Variables
REGL 0.0563** 0.0255 0.0160 0.0532
REGH 0.0382 0.0436 -0.0150 0.0617
DTWO 0.0475"* 0.0239 0.0444... 0.0272
Service Variable
WIRELINE 0.0325 0.0242 0.0318 0.0239
Market Variables
MMATT 0.0087* 0.0020 0.0086* 0.0020
MMSBC -0.0248* 0.0065 -0.0255* 0.0064
MMBA 0.0106 0.0071 0.0116 0.0072
MMSPRINT 0.0144* 0.0017 0.0147* 0.0017
DENSITY (Log) -0.0719" 0.0293 0.0994 0.1099
LAND (Log) 0.0786* 0.0281 -0.2646 0.1499
AVGINC (Log) 0.008 0.0617 >-0.0001 > 0.0001
TTI (Log) 0.0664 0.1857 0.2862 0.3579
AGEMKT -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0072* 0.0006
Indicator Variables
REGION2 -0.0448*** 0.0322 (dropped)
REGION3 -0.0114 0.0322 (dropped)
REGION4 0.0154 0.0440 (dropped)
PERIOD1 1.2220* 0.0836 (dropped)
PERIOD2 0.9008* 0.0512 0.3101* 0.0394
PERIOD3 0.4104* 0.0288 0.2164* 0.0265
PERIOD4 0.2756* 0.6561 0.1047 0.0730
CONSTANT 2.86* 0.6658 5.7657* 1.7486
R2  0.7873 0.4189
1. The dependent variable for both models is the log of consumer prices for 100 to 160 "any-time" minutes
offered by each operator in each time period. 2. Column (i) shows GLS random-effects regression results.
Column (ii) shows GLS fixed-effects regression results. Using Hausman's specification test, the random-effects
model was found to be fully efficient and consistent at a confidence level of 99%. 3. N = 440 for both
regressions. 4. (a) * significant at the 99% confidence level, (b) ** significant at the 95% confidence level, and
(c) *** significant at the 90% confidence level.
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APPENDIX 3
ESTIMATES OF PRICE CAP AND PROFIT REGULATION
(i) (ii)
Full Reduced-Form Model with
Variable Full Reduced-Form Model Regulatory Differentiation
Coefficient I Standard error Coefficient Standard error
Regulatory Variables Equation (i)
REGL 0.0563* 0.0255
REGH 0.0382 0.0436





DTWO 0.0475** 0.0239 0.0495** 0.0239
WIRELINE 0.0325 0.0242 0.0324 0.0241
MMATT 0.0087* 0.0020 0.0087* 0.0020
MMSBC -0.0248* 0.0065 0.0244* 0.0065
MMBA 0.0106 0.0071 0.0105 0.0071
MMSPRINT 0.0144* 0.0017 0.0144* 0.0017
LAND (Log) 0.0786* 0.0281 0.0803* 0.0284
AVGINC (Log) 0.0127 0.0608 > 0.0001 > 0.0001
DENSITY (Log) -0.0719* 0.0293 -0.0683* 0.0295
TI (Log) 0.0579 0.1851 0.0966 0.1863
AGEMKT -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0007 0.0004
REGION2 -0.0448*** 0.0317 -0.0528*** 0.0328
REGION3 -0.0114 0.0322 -0.0215 0.0322
REGION4 0.0154 0.044 -0.0017 0.0452
PERIODI 1.2220* 0.0836 1.2235* 0.0835
PERIOD2 0.9008* 0.0512 0.8948* 0.0511
PERIOD3 0.4104* 0.0288 0.4096* 0.0288
PERIOD4 0.2756* 0.0368 0.2778* 0.0386
CONSTANT 2.81* 0.6561 2.849* 0.6645
R2 0.7873 0.79
1. Coefficient for REGPCPR significant at the 87% level. 2. The dependent variable for both models is the log o
consumer prices for 100 to 160 "any-time" minutes offered by each operator in each time period. 3. N = 440.4.
(a) * significant at the 99% confidence level, (b) ** significant at the 95% confidence level, and (c) *** significant
at the 90% confidence level.
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